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The study of perceptual decisions has been developed as a substitute for investigating more 
complex multiple attribute decisions. However, little attention has been paid to the similarity of 
results between the two literatures. Four separate behavioral experiments and a secondary trial-
by-trial analysis investigated the sensitivity of perceptual decisions. Results were compared to 
both previous perceptual decision research and that of multiple attribute decisions in an effort to 
bridge the divide. The first experiment examined the effect of increasing the similarity of 
available response alternatives on accuracy and reaction time. The results suggest that high levels 
of similarity can begin to degrade the decision process by lowering accuracy and slowing 
reaction time; however these changes may be dependent on the extent to which the alternatives 
use overlapping neuronal pools. The second experiment examined the effect of increasing the 
number of response alternatives available for a single decision. The results suggest that 
increasing the number of alternatives may not affect performance until some critical point (in this 
case, eight alternatives). The third experiment examined how delay in the presentation of 
evidence compared to the start of the decision process affects the overall accuracy and reaction 
time once information is given. The results demonstrate that as the decision process extends in 
time, decisions are made faster and less accurately. Finally, the fourth experiment examined how 
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the interrupting the incoming stream of information with either highly informative or highly 
misleading evidence would affect the decision. The results illustrated a complicated picture in 
which highly informative evidence accelerated decisions but misleading evidence failed to slow 
decisions. In addition to the individual aims, a secondary analysis investigated potential trial-by-
trial variation in performance. There was some evidence that participants made ongoing 
adjustments to their strategy dependent on performance, but only when feedback was available; 
previous trial status (e.g., highly informative vs. highly misleading evidence) did not affect 
current trial performance. In sum the results demonstrate that perceptual decisions do show high 
levels of sensitivity to a variety of manipulations, but fail to replicate many of the results from 
more complicated multiple attribute decisions.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are waiting for the bus at the end of a long workday. When it is sunny 
outside, you can clearly see the bus marquee as the vehicle comes closer, allowing you to easily 
determine the route number and consider the secondary decision of whether to hail the driver or 
step back from the curb. However, during a downpour or snowstorm, the bus marquee becomes 
difficult to see, with only bits of information reaching your eyes at any point in time. The 
decision about which route is designated on the marquee becomes difficult, even effortful, and 
you probably watch the bus for a longer amount of time in order to decipher the numbers. This 
example highlights how even simple perceptual acts like identifying the route number on a bus 
marquee can become a laborious decision process. Yet despite the increased difficulty and effort 
involved, the example fails to capture the additional complexity of the decisions that may follow 
the identification, such as determining whether or not that route will take you to your destination, 
how likely it is that a better bus will arrive soon, and remembering to take a particular route in 
order to stop by the grocery store on the way home. This dissertation will explore how closely 
perceptual decisions approximate the variability of the natural environment, such as the timing of 
incoming evidence, changes in the fidelity of that evidence, and similarity between potential 
alternatives. In addition, attention will be paid to whether or not the results from perceptual 
decision studies agree with the findings in multiple attribute decisions to determine whether 
perceptual decisions are truly a simplified version of the same process.  
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1.1 OVERVIEW 
The decision process is a complicated series of stages that involves the reception of 
external input, the interpretation of that input, and the selection of a choice among output options 
(Schall, 1999). The perceptual decision process has been favored as a way to examine the 
decision process in a simplified environment, allowing for finer manipulation and study. 
However, there is some question as to whether the simplified perceptual decisions truly emulate 
the same behavioral characteristics as more traditional multiple attribute decisions. For example, 
past research has shown that the amount of noise in a stimulus can change both the accuracy and 
the reaction time of an impending decision (e.g., Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998). Although this lends 
insight into the decision process, previous studies have generally involved only two response 
options (e.g., bright/dark, red/green, left/right). This approach does not accurately reflect more 
common situations in the environment that involve the vetting of multiple possibilities at once. 
Research on multiple attribute decisions has shown that increasing the number of options can 
change decision dynamics, either slowing response time or causing adoption of strategies to 
speed decisions (Tversky & Sattath, 1979; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Payne, Bettman, & 
Johnson, 1988). However, it remains unclear whether perceptual decisions will also show similar 
changes in behavior to the multiple attribute counterparts they are expected to simulate. 
There are also other aspects of the perceptual decision literature that fail to capture some 
of the variability of the real world. Although different levels of stimulus fidelity may be assessed 
across trials (e.g., more or fewer white pixels compared to black pixels during brightness 
discrimination), little has been done to test changes in fidelity within a trial (e.g., a shifting 
amount of white versus black pixels during a single trial). When trying to recognize the bus 
marquee during the snowstorm as described above, the snow would be constantly shifting in the 
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wind and causing moments of clearer views and more obstructed views. However, we must 
integrate information over the course of those more informative and less informative moments in 
order to reach our final identification. Therefore it is important to understand not only how 
perceptual decisions are reached with static amounts of evidence, but also how the process 
handles fluctuations in the fidelity of evidence over time. 
 In addition, the timing used in the majority of tasks has involved the presentation of a 
stimulus after a fixation period, creating an association between the start of a trial and the 
presentation of perceptual evidence. However, the natural environment rarely has clear signals 
for when evidence towards a decision may arrive. Before accepting that perceptual decisions 
adequately emulate the greater general decision process, particularly when discussing potential 
related brain mechanisms, this dissertation attempts to answer some of these open questions. 
Examining perceptual decisions affords the researcher an opportunity to remove or 
control task and stimulus parameters, such as bias or expertise, which might be indefinable or 
uncontrollable in more complex situations. There is also the expectation that determining the 
mechanisms underlying basic perceptual decisions will serve as a theoretical base for more 
complex or abstract forms of decision-making, such as the determination of whether a presented 
item has been stored in memory or not. However, research on perceptual decisions spans several 
tasks, stimulus sets, and goals, making comparisons across studies difficult. Previous studies 
have demonstrated that even small changes in task structure can change the decision process 
(Ebbesen & Konecni, 1980), highlighting the importance of building a set of experiments using a 
single stimulus and task paradigm with only minor manipulations. Constraining the current series 
of experiments to the same stimulus and highly similar task structure should allow for cleaner 
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examination of how each manipulation affects the decision process and limit the effects of 
extraneous variables. 
The remainder of this chapter will be an overview of the extensive previous research on 
perceptual decisions to date, including behavioral studies, neurophysiological studies using 
macaques, and the limited human research thus far using electroencephalography (EEG) and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). There will then be a brief description of the open 
questions this dissertation attempts to answer, with previews of the experiments and results 
presented throughout this document. There are two overarching purposes threaded throughout 
the experiments. First, the experiments are intended to serve as a bridge among isolated 
behavioral and neurophysiological experiments described throughout the introduction that 
involve a variety of stimuli and task structures. By presenting a series of experiments with the 
same basic stimulus and task paradigm but individual manipulations related to the literature, 
hopefully a more cohesive picture of what affects perceptual decisions will arise from the results. 
Second, references will be made throughout this work to findings from multiple attribute 
decision studies. By examining the parallels and divergences between the perceptual and 
multiple attribute decision literature, we can better understand how well studying the perceptual 
decision process emulates the general decision process and what kinds of generalizations are 
possible. However, before setting up the experimental crux of the problem, it is important to 
consider the theoretical roots. The following section will describe the theoretical underpinnings 
and assumptions used throughout this document, as well as some of the language from 
mathematical modeling that is used for descriptive and illustrative purposes. 
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1.2 THEORETICAL AND MATHEMATICAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT DECISIONS 
Decisions can come about based on internal information, external stimulation, or some 
combination of the two, and may or may not carry an extrinsic reward. Finally, some decisions 
may be made instantaneously, while others can take several seconds, minutes, or longer. The 
process can be simplified into the basic model depicted in Figure 1; through a sequence of stages 
information is received, a decision process occurs in which that information is evaluated and 
evidence towards a particular alternative is extracted, and an output is selected. After some 
decisions, a reward may occur which reinforces the chosen output. For example, in previous 
work (Ploran et al., 2007), I used fMRI in humans to separate brain activity into patterns 
indicative of three stages of information processing: sensory input, evidence gathering, and 
decision (Figure 1, right panels). Fast-rising, sustained levels of activity in regions in the 
occipital lobes were indicative of sensory processing, activity in parietal and middle frontal areas 
for which the rate of increase in activity changed in accordance to the timing of the final 
response suggested an ongoing evidence gathering process, and areas in the frontal lobe 
responded transiently to the specific response output (Ploran et al., 2007; Ploran, Tremel, Nelson, 
& Wheeler, submitted). This separation of patterns lends support to the use of the model depicted 
in Figure 1, at least at a broad scale as required by the spatial limitations of fMRI. Due to the 
breadth of this phenomenon, this document will focus on the decision process after information 
has been received and prior to the selection of output, referencing data from healthy humans and 
macaque monkeys during perceptual decisions. 
However, returning to potential theoretical assumptions without limitations, the evidence 
gathering stage may involve several subprocesses. Rachlin (1988) suggested separating the 
identification of alternatives, evaluation of alternatives, and a decision mechanism from one 
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another (Figure 2). These subprocesses work well with the theme here that there are separate 
levels of complexity that can individually affect evidence gathering and the selection of output. 
In the bus marquee example used earlier, the decision process changed dependent on the clarity 
of the marquee through particular weather conditions (i.e., evaluation of alternatives). Yet, the 
decision process may also change depending on whether you know of four or eight routes that 
use the particular bus stop by which you are standing (i.e., identification of alternatives). 
Although each of these stages can individually affect the decision process, it is more likely that 
the quality and/or amount of detail contained in the input interacts with the number of possible 
alternatives to make the largest impact on the decision process. Due to the diversity of language 
used to describe the decision process, the following terms will be used throughout this document 
to represent the three processing stages: information will describe incoming sensory input, 
evidence will describe what the decision process derives from the information and integrates 
together, and response will be used to indicate the termination of the process and resulting 
output. 
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Figure 1. Simplified framework of the decision process with three major stages. To the 
right of the stages are fMRI results that lend to support to the dissociation of timing 
(Ploran et al., 2007). 
 8 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Separation of the evidence gathering stage into multiple subprocesses (modified 
from Rachlin, 1988). 
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The evidence gathering or evaluation stage of the decision process has been represented 
by variety of mathematical models; the two most popular are race models (Smith, 2000; Usher & 
McClelland, 2001; Ratcliff, 2006) and diffusion models (Ratcliff, 1978, 2002; Ratcliff & 
Rouder, 2000; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). Both types of models are sequential-sampling models 
that use representations of evidence that change with incoming information over time and have 
to pass a threshold in order to trigger a response. However, the models differ in the number of 
representations for response alternatives, the manner in which evidence is accumulated, and the 
placements of threshold. Due to the frequent use of these models to account for behavioral 
perceptual decision data (e.g., Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008) and 
neurophysiological data (e.g., Gold & Shadlen, 2001), several modeling terms will be used 
throughout this dissertation when discussing potential mechanisms and parameters of the neural 
underpinnings that could create the behavioral results seen here. The following will serve as a 
brief primer on the type of parameters these models use, the similarities between the two types, 
and how we might use these models to create predictions for the current studies. 
 While race models have a separate “counter” for information (or evidence) towards each 
possible response (Figure 3b, 3c), diffusion models use a single representation for evidence 
(Figure 3a); this leads to a major difference between race and diffusion models. Because race 
models have separate counters for each possible response, the decision is literally a race to see 
which counter reaches threshold first (Figure 3b, 3c). Each counter increases with supportive 
evidence, but decreases after opposing evidence. However, as more response options are added 
to the race model, increases and decreases of equal magnitude would make it increasingly 
impossible for any one counter to pass threshold due to low positive-to-negative evidence ratios. 
Therefore, negative evidence for each response must be scaled by the number of available 
 10 
responses (Usher & McClelland, 2001). It is possible, with the right number of responses and 
supporting evidence among those responses (i.e., even distribution of positive and negative 
evidence), to have a very close race in which the response that passes threshold is only slightly 
ahead of the next best option (for more detail on race / accumulator models, see Usher & 
McClelland, 2001). 
In diffusion models, on the other hand, the evidence is gathered in only one parameter 
that represents the balance of information between the two possible responses. This leads to a 
tug-of-war in the direction of the parameter according to the available evidence; the evidence 
parameter can only pass threshold and finalize a decision after a continuous stream of evidence 
for the same response, rather than a noisy stream with evidence for both responses (Figure 3a). 
However, because diffusion models are only able to have two possible responses at the most 
(there are also single outcome diffusion models) and evidence is gathered in one parameter, the 
tug-of-war happens on an equal basis. Unlike the race model, there is no scaling of negative 
evidence in relation to the number of possible responses; evidence for and against a response in a 
diffusion model is weighted equally. This causes a situation in which as the signal-to-noise ratio 
decreases (and therefore some amount of evidence is available for each option), it becomes 
increasingly difficult for the parameter to gather enough evidence and pass threshold (Figure 3a, 
dashed line). On the other hand, if there is a high signal-to-noise ratio in favor of one response, 
the parameter will quickly drift towards the boundary for that response (Figure 3a, solid line; for 
more detail on diffusion models, see Shadlen et al., 2006; Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993). 
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Figure 3. Examples of the mechanisms behind diffusion and race models. (a) Diffusion 
model with thresholds for each option and drift parameters representing two separate 
decisions: a fast decision (solid line) and a slow decision (dashed line); (b, c) Race model in 
which each line represents a counter and both accrue at the same time for either fast (b) or 
slow (c) decisions. 
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The main parameters that affect the trajectory within a diffusion model are starting point, 
drift rate, and threshold. The starting point is the point from which the decision parameter begins 
accumulating evidence. By allowing the starting point to vary trial-to-trial, diffusion models can 
adequately account for fast errors; if the starting point is much higher than usual, it only takes a 
few bits of information to cross the upper threshold even if the next bits of information would 
lead the model to cross the lower threshold instead. The drift rate is the average amount of 
increase towards a threshold per bit of information. Finally, the threshold is the level of activity 
needed in order to trigger a decision; the threshold can be manipulated to be more liberal or 
conservative depending on the requirements for the task (e.g., speed versus accuracy, Fitts, 1966; 
Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). Aside from these parameters that vary according to task, there is 
usually also a constant (sometimes with its own trial-to-trial variability) that accounts for all the 
non-decision computation, such as the time it takes to execute a motor output indicating a 
decision. Although there has been a larger discussion of whether or not these are the only 
necessary parameters and the need for variation in them (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993), these 
represent the parameters that overlap in most diffusion model accounts. 
Despite differences, both types of models include a threshold and include some 
fluctuation in the decision parameter as a function of incoming stimulus noise. Although the race 
model would be more appropriate to use for decisions with more than two choices (an important 
constraint for diffusion models that has been recently explored using neurophysiological data, 
Churchland, Kiani, & Shadlen, 2008), it is outside the scope of this dissertation to test the models 
for efficacy. Instead, the concepts within the models will be used as references and good 
theoretical parameters to consider when examining behavioral data. The combination of the 
starting point, drift rate, and threshold concepts have allowed models to account for a variety of 
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behavioral data, including both memory (Ratcliff, 1978) and perceptual decisions (Ratcliff & 
Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). These parameters have also been used to fit 
neurophysiological data from perceptual decisions (e.g., Gold & Shadlen, 2001), demonstrating 
the flexibility of these parameters to account for both behavioral measures like accuracy and 
reaction time, as well as the underlying neural processes. Therefore it is these three concepts that 
will be used to create questions, predictions, manipulations, and ultimately possible explanations 
for the results.  
1.3 EVOLUTION OF BEHAVIORAL STUDIES OF PERCEPTION 
The study of perception harks back to the earliest psychophysical experiments examining 
anatomy, physiology, and behavior. However, the study of perceptual decisions, in which the 
subject must respond to the stimulus in some instructed manner, has a more research history. 
Beginning with stimulus-response paradigms in which subjects make quick pre-determined 
responses to the presentation of a particular associated stimulus (Hick, 1952; Hyman, 1953), the 
study of perceptual decisions has evolved into a closer investigation of what affects the 
interpretation of a stimulus that in turn creates the behavioral response. The following section 
will describe some of the evolution of the study of perceptual decisions from a behavioral 
standpoint. Succeeding sections will then extend this evolution to studies of neurophysiology in 
macaques and the use of neuroimaging techniques in humans. 
An important consideration that should be maintained throughout reading this document 
is what exactly constitutes a perceptual decision, versus the pure act of perception without 
interpretation. Humans make decisions constantly, often without conscious awareness. For 
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example, perceptual recognition is usually an automatic process; the ability to identify and 
respond with an object’s name can occur within 1000 ms of presentation (Rossion & Pourtois, 
2004). Similarly, word identification can occur within 750 ms of presentation, for words up to 6 
letters in length and 2 syllables (Frederiksen & Kroll, 1976). However, if the object or word is 
occluded or incomplete, more calculations among the alternatives must be made before a final 
identification response is selected. Instead of the fast, easy recognition made when all the 
perceptual information is available, you might pause to gather more evidence towards the correct 
choice. When not given enough information, the act of perception becomes an effortful decision 
process that requires gathering of evidence from incoming stimulus information and 
interpretation of that evidence prior to the selection of a response.  
Behavioral research on perceptual decisions has largely focused on two-choice paradigms 
using motion, color, or brightness discriminations (e.g., Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff & 
McKoon, 2008). These studies collectively demonstrate that the timing and accuracy of a 
perceptual decision are functions of uncertainty (i.e., noise), both in the stimulus itself and the 
neural processes underling the decision process. The uncertainty in the stimulus can be a result of 
actual sensory qualities (i.e., the number of white versus black pixels; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998) 
or the duration of the stimulus prior to masking (Ratcliff & Rouder, 2000). Biological sources of 
uncertainty arise from the noise in neural pools encoding potential alternatives (Gold & Shadlen, 
2001). In any case, higher uncertainty creates longer and less accurate responses. 
However, there are limitations to the use of 2-choice paradigms when attempting to 
describe the perceptual decision process more generally. First, it is rare that one is presented with 
two discrete choices. Often we are presented with noisy sensory information without a clear 
delineation of the possible identity. If there are multiple response options to vet in relation to the 
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presented stimulus, processing may take longer than when there are only two response options. 
In fact, stimulus-response paradigms have long demonstrated that as participants are required to 
respond with unique responses to an increasing number of stimuli, the reaction time after each 
presentation is longer than when there are fewer possible stimuli among the presentation set 
(Hyman, 1953). After initial training, this paradigm doesn’t even require a decision so much as 
the automated response selection from an unambiguous stimulus, yet the number of possible 
stimuli still has a strong effect (accounting for up to 97% of the variance in reaction time). 
It has also been shown in decisions involving multiple attributes that an increase in the 
number of response alternatives can spontaneously prompt the adoption of strategies and 
heuristics to aid in decision making, particularly when certain time pressures and other task 
demands are present (Payne, Bettmann, & Johnson, 1988). For example, the “elimination by 
aspects” strategy (Tversky, 1972) allows the decision maker to rule out one or more response 
options very early in the decision period, thereby rerouting information towards the remaining 
possibilities. Alternatively, the “majority of confirming dimensions” strategy (Russo & Dosher, 
1983) considers pairs of alternatives out of the many available options and selects the best of 
each pair to remain available while discarding the worst of each pair. However, there are many 
more possible strategies than described here, and in addition, it is possible to combine strategies 
into a more comprehensive or efficient approach (e.g., eliminate unlikely possibilities and then 
compare pairs; Payne, Bettmann, & Johnson, 1988). 
A recent study using 2-, 3-, and 4-choice letter discriminations found increasing reaction 
times and decreasing accuracy as the number of response alternatives increased (Leite & Ratcliff, 
2010). This suggests that the decision process changed as there were more response alternatives 
available for matching the evidence. However, it is unclear whether four alternatives are enough 
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to cause significant changes in strategy as observed in multiple attribute decisions. The impact of 
the number of alternatives on the perceptual decision process is investigated further in 3.0 , 
including a post-experiment questionnaire on possible strategy adoption to assess whether or not 
participants attempted to mitigate any detriment to performance as the number of response 
alternatives increased. 
Another consideration for the validity of previous perceptual decision research is that 2-
choice experiments often present opposing choices (e.g., rightward vs. leftward motion, light vs. 
dark pixels). However, the external world is created from a continuum of sensory stimuli, and 
often we must make very fine distinctions between two similar choices (e.g., “Does that bus 
marquee say 71B or 71D?”). One previous study (Ratcliff & Rouder, 2000) did assess easy vs. 
hard letter discriminations (e.g., E vs. C., or E vs. F) and found that similar letter pairs were 
associated with lower accuracy and longer response times. Unfortunately, the study was focused 
on validating a diffusion model of decision making and the results based on degrees of similarity 
were not fully explored.  
While the binary choice studies have laid a strong foundation for the examination of 
perceptual decisions, related research has demonstrated that the internal decision process may 
not be strictly dichotomous. Experiments allowing subjects to indicate more than one guess on 
various temporal and spatial selective attention paradigms have found that while the individual 
responses were discretely categorical in nature and subjects did not report being “half aware” of 
the targets (Sergent & Dehaene, 2004), their responses arose from graded distributions (Vul, 
Hanus, & Kanwisher, 2009). These results suggest that there is some noise in the underlying 
cognitive process prior to the decision. If the distributions for two similar options overlap, 
responses may be more difficult to make compared with options with non-overlapping 
 17 
distributions. This possibility is examined in 2.0 , which assesses how performance changes as 
the two available alternatives become more similar to one another. 
A last consideration is the effect of prior performance on current decisions. That is, aside 
from within-trial noise and variability in the stimulus, does across-trial noise and variability also 
affect decisions? That is, is each individual decision based solely on stimulus aspects from the 
current trial, or also from the characteristics demonstrated about a stimulus over previous trials 
as well? Both temporal and spatial selective attention responses appear to be affected by only 
uncertainty in the stimulus itself on a given trial (within trial variability), rather than potential 
across-trial variability (Vul, Hanus, & Kanwisher, 2009). That is, the uncertainty of a stimulus 
within the trial has a larger effect on the decision process than the accumulated known 
uncertainty of stimulus identification over the previous trials. However, previous theoretical 
accounts of effort and achievement behavior have considered a more dynamic selection of effort 
that is affected by task difficulty, relationship of the current task to previous tasks, previous 
outcomes, and possibly motivation (see Thomas, 1983 for review). Given the similarity between 
the models for selective attention and perceptual decisions, it is important to test how ongoing 
performance affects each new decision, as well as how bias in previous trials (in the form of 
highly coherent information for or against the correct alternative) can affect the treatment of 
information on new trials, as was done for several experiments in 6.0 . 
Together, these behavioral studies demonstrate the breadth of manipulations that have 
been used to study perceptual decisions. In particular, consideration should be made regarding 
the variety of stimulus sets (e.g., bright/dark pixels, red/green pixels, letters, etc.). The physical 
characteristics involved in each of these stimuli result in a variety of brain areas necessary for 
processing the sensory input prior to interpretation during the decision process. Also, some 
 18 
stimuli involved quantifiable amounts (brightness patches) whereas others did not (letters). These 
issues make it difficult to compare across studies, a problem that the current set of studies 
attempts to address by using the same stimulus throughout. In addition, some of the literature 
involved results from multiple attribute decisions (e.g., Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988), 
highlighting the question of whether perceptual decisions adequately emulate a more general 
decision process in simplified form. The discussion of results from the current experiments will 
include references to both the perceptual and multiple attribute decision research in an attempt to 
bridge between these two disparate fields. 
1.4 NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL SUPPORT FOR DECISION MODELS 
There is a wealth of literature on the primary sensory, secondary sensory, evidence 
gathering, execution of response, and reward/feedback stages of perceptual decisions using 
neurophysiological recordings in macaques and rats. These studies span various visual paradigms 
(Shadlen & Newsome, 2001; Roitman & Shadlen, 2002; Horwitz, Batista, & Newsome, 2004; 
Lo & Wang, 2006), flutter/grating sensory discriminations (Romo & Salinas, 2003; Salinas, 
Hernandez, Zainos, & Romo, 2000), auditory discriminations (Lemus, Hernandez, & Romo, 
2009), and even responses based on gustatory stimuli (MacDonald, Meck, Simon, & Nicolelis, 
2009). From this broad testing of the various sensory circuits, there has been the emergence and 
collective adherence to a systems level theory of decision making that applies to all these 
situations. This research has supported the notion that decisions arise from a series of 
hierarchical brain areas, spanning sensory, evidence accumulation, and decision execution 
 19 
processes. An example of which brain areas may be involved and how each area might affect the 
decision process will be described presently.  
A large portion of the research on perceptual decisions has been conducted using 
neurophysiological measures of visual discrimination in macaques. Importantly, several 
researchers have adopted a motion discrimination paradigm as an easy way to manipulate the 
perceptual information available for the decision. The adoption of this stimulus presentation 
across many studies has created a cohesive narrative about the potential development of a 
decision across multiple brain areas. The knowledge of how various manipulations affect 
responses during this paradigm was the primary reason for its use throughout this dissertation. 
Therefore, it is important to consider both the behavioral and neural patterns found within the 
neurophysiological literature when constructing the experiments and predictions described later.  
The motion discrimination paradigm has been used with both humans (Shulman et al., 
1999; Shulman et al., 2003; Palmer, Huk, & Shadlen, 2005) and non-lesioned macaques 
(Celebrini & Newsome, 1994; Kim & Shadlen, 1999; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001), and lends 
itself to a variety of manipulations. The basic paradigm involves a screen with a large number of 
dots that move randomly, making the display look like a simple version of television static. 
Researchers can manipulate how many dots move together coherently in one direction, and 
subjects discriminate the trajectory of motion. By varying the coherence of the dots (i.e., how 
many dots are moving together), the quality of the motion signal is manipulated and the 
discrimination of the direction becomes more or less difficult. In an easy discrimination (>50% 
coherence), decisions are made quickly, because the signal clearly outweighs the noise. At lower 
levels of coherence (<20%), the signal of the motion is disrupted by the majority noise of the 
randomly moving dots and discrimination becomes difficult. 
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By examining the single-unit neurophysiology research in monkeys, it appears that 
perceptual decisions arise from activity spreading from the highly motion selective area middle 
temporal area (MT) (Celebrini & Newsome, 1994), to visually responsive areas involved in 
preparation of eye movements such as the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) (Shadlen & Newsome, 
2001; Roitman & Shadlen, 2002; Hanks, Ditterich, & Shadlen, 2006) and superior colliculus 
(Horwitz, Batista, & Newsome, 2004; Lo & Wang, 2006), and finally into the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), specifically the frontal eye fields (FEF). These final frontal areas are 
non-visually responsive areas that may be involved in motor planning, reward, or attention (Kim 
& Shadlen, 1999; Leon & Shadlen, 1999). Collectively, the main finding of these papers was that 
brain areas involved in the earlier stages of visual processing modulated activity based on the 
coherence of motion, while areas farther upstream reacted less to stimulus properties and more to 
the impending decision (i.e., the preparation of eye movement indicating the decision). 
Early experiments testing motion discrimination in LIP demonstrated a difference in the 
increasing or decreasing of neural activity dependent on both the coherence of motion and the 
final decision (Shadlen & Newsome, 2001). Specifically, when highly coherent motion towards 
the response field caused neurons to increase in activity very quickly; however, when motion 
was weak (but still towards the response field), neurons increased in activity at a slower rate. 
Similar differences in the rate of change in neuronal activity were found during motion away 
from the response field, such that neurons decreased in activity more quickly for strong motion 
away from the response field than weak motion (Shadlen & Newsome, 2001). Interestingly, 
despite the differences in rate of increase or decrease, activity reached a common level by the 
end of the trial, prior to the saccade to indicate decision. In addition, a later study (Huk & 
Shadlen, 2005) incorporated short (100ms) bursts of highly coherent motion within a subset of 
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trials and found the accumulation rate of neural firing changed in trajectory and reached the 
common level earlier than without the burst. That is, while initially accumulating normally, the 
burst caused the accumulation rate to increase mid-trial. However, in both these studies the 
monkeys were required to maintain fixation until a cue, so it is unknown whether or not this 
would have resulted in faster reaction times (e.g., faster rise in activity to the common plateau 
level would have triggered a threshold and caused a detection response).  
The LIP studies demonstrated how neurophysiology can be an extremely useful 
methodology since it allows for close examination of neural activity on the millisecond level. 
This affords the opportunity to consider differences in activity between conditions in a very 
minute way. However, one limitation of the aforementioned LIP studies was the use of a delayed 
response task. As mentioned above, the monkeys were required to wait after seeing the motion 
display until a cue gave permission to make the saccade indicating the decision. This wait prior 
to response created a situation in which inferences were made about the decision process without 
knowing the precise moment at which the process ended, leading to possible confounding of 
decision processes and the maintenance of a motor plan. By using a reaction time experiment in 
which the monkeys made a saccade upon making a decision, Roitman & Shadlen (2002) were 
able to examine the activity leading directly up to the decision in a more natural timecourse. The 
comparison of activity for different levels of coherence illustrated the same modulation of 
activity throughout the trial, such that higher levels of coherence were associated with faster 
increases and lower levels of coherence with slower increases. However, the important 
comparison grouped trials by reaction time regardless of coherence, eliminating any modulation 
based on sensory efficacy of the stimulus. This comparison illustrated that faster increases were 
also associated with earlier response times, and slower increases were associated with longer 
 22 
response times. Combined with the modulation of activity based on coherence, the difference in 
relative timing of activity and its relation to response time is a good indicator that area LIP is 
involved in some stage of the decision-making process – potentially as an integrator between 
sensory information and the decision variable (Roitman & Shadlen, 2002; Mazurek et al, 2003). 
Perhaps the most interesting results are from a very carefully controlled experiment 
attempting to eliminate the confounding of the decision choice with movement planning to 
indicate that choice (Horwitz, Batista, & Newsome, 2004). While the traditional motion 
discrimination paradigm presented both the central viewing window and the two dots marking 
the possible decisions in their relative locations, the new paradigm moved the dots around the 
screen as a pair so that the monkey had to select the dot based on its position relative to the other 
dot, rather than the viewing window. The change in the paradigm created a situation in which a 
rightward motion stimulus could result in a leftward eye movement, even though the eye 
movement would target the right dot out of the pair. Movement planning could now be in 
opposition to the perception of motion. However, the most crucial aspect of the new paradigm 
was that the decision targets were only shown after a delay during which no motion was present. 
This means that any potential evidence accumulation that occurs should only be related to the 
decision, and not the planning of the movement to indicate that decision. Indeed, the researchers 
found that a small subset (~10%) of neurons in the superior colliculus demonstrated modulation 
during the presence of motion that was indicative of the decision, even without available targets 
for which to plan an eye movement. This suggests that some neurons are able to hold abstract 
representations of a decision without the explicit targets necessary to execute action based on 
that decision (Horwitz, Batista, & Newsome, 2004). 
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Recent research has expanded the motion discrimination task from two to four 
alternatives (Churchland, Kiani, & Shadlen, 2008). The main finding was that increasing the 
number of alternatives resulted in a decreased initial firing rate towards the correct alternative, 
with a slower buildup to a stable threshold. Behaviorally, 4-choice decisions took longer and 
were less accurate than 2-choice decisions. This suggests that increasing the number of 
alternatives may change how neural areas process the task, altering accuracy and reaction time. 
This potential effect was examined more closely in 3.0 . 
The control condition for the 2- vs. 4-choice experiment was to include a 2-choice trial in 
which the alternatives were perpendicular to each other rather than opposite (Churchland, Kiani, 
& Shadlen, 2008). These 90° trials resulted in an intermediate decrease in reaction time and 
firing rate buildup compared to the 180° trials. This suggests that there was a processing 
difference between the original opposing response alternatives and the slightly more similar 
perpendicular alternatives. The experiment in 2.0 examines how similarity of response 
alternatives may affect accuracy and reaction time, with the general prediction that as similarity 
increases the decision process becomes more difficult. 
These neurophysiological experiments demonstrate several important characteristics 
described by the decision making models. First, the change in the rate of increase in firing 
dependent on the response may represent the evaluation of alternatives (Figure 2) that we would 
expect given different efficacies of evidence. Importantly, Roitman and Shadlen (2002) 
illustrated that these changes in rate are associated with changes in response time independent of 
stimulus efficacy. This ties into the second characteristic of decision making highlighted here: 
the need for a stable threshold. In these experiments, neurons throughout the brain appeared to 
reach a steady threshold level prior to a decision, in both the delayed and immediate versions. 
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Despite changes to the rate of increase in firing, the decision was not made until this threshold is 
reached, indicating a stable cut-off mechanism in the decision process. Therefore increases in 
activity in sensory areas like MT in response to increases in coherence of the stimulus in turn 
increase the rate of firing in evidence gathering areas like LIP and superior colliculus, causing 
the threshold to be reached sooner.  
1.5 NEURAL BASIS OF PERCEPTUAL DECISIONS IN HUMANS 
The neurophysiological literature highlights the important role that timing plays in 
determining whether or not an area of the brain is involved in sensory, decision, or movement 
planning processes. By using paradigms that attempted to separate the processes, the 
neurophysiology literature has made significant headway into determining the pathways for 
certain visual and somatosensory tasks. However, due to the invasive nature of the methodology, 
it limits these studies to the use of non-human primate subjects. Fortunately, advances have been 
made in the analysis of the blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signal within fMRI, high-
density electroencephalogram (EEG) recording, and the concurrent use of fMRI and event-
related potential (ERP) recordings. These advances now allow researchers to make some 
statements about the comparative timing within a region, and tentatively make comparisons 
across regions. 
For example, McKeeff & Tong (2007) created a face/non-face paradigm using Mooney 
contorted images of faces; the Mooney transformation alters a grayscale image into pure black 
and white contrast, masking the usual contours and lines of the original image. Because facial 
features can often be very small in scale, altering the quality of the image by using this technique 
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highly increases the difficulty of the discrimination. Interestingly, among the trials for which the 
stimulus was categorized as a face, there were timing differences in fusiform gyrus (a highly 
face-selective area) dependent on the response time. Faster face categorizations were associated 
with faster BOLD rise times, while slower discriminations had slower rise times. However, this 
difference was not present for trials in which the stimulus was categorized as a non-face. The 
authors suggest that this timing difference was indicative of top-down influences on fusiform 
face area as evidence of face contours was gathered from the otherwise indecipherable image 
(McKeeff & Tong, 2007). This suggests that since the participant was actively looking for a face, 
this top-down information drove the search for facial contours. However, the simpler answer 
may be that as lower visual areas parsed the contours of the incoming sensory information into 
recognizable facial features, more activity occurred in fusiform gyrus from feedforward 
connections. As soon as this activity reached some threshold, the brain could categorize the 
image as a face. If the activity in fusiform gyrus did not reach some predetermined threshold, the 
found contours were deemed noise, and the image was categorized as a non-face. Consequently, 
on trials when there is a faster increase in activity in fusiform gyrus, categorization occurs 
quicker than when activity rises more slowly because the threshold is met faster. 
The quality of facial features was also used by Thielscher & Pessoa (2007) to create an 
emotion discrimination experiment using faces with varying levels of expression; however, in 
this case the images themselves were not transformed. Instead, the researchers maintained clear 
images, but manipulated the extent of the frown and openness of the eyes to create varying 
degrees of expression. By focusing the analysis on the brain areas active during the 
discrimination of neutral stimuli, the researchers were able to examine how activity evolved 
when there was little drive by the sensory stimulus. Instead, brain areas active during the 
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categorization of neutral stimuli were assumed to represent the decision process. The main 
analysis again suggested a series of brain areas stretching from visual areas, through emotion-
related areas, and finally to higher-level areas.  
However, the more interesting analysis considered how the activation in a decision area 
should correlate with response time. The authors suggested that if a brain area is associated with 
the decision, the activation should mimic the response time curve. That is, trial-by-trial 
fluctuations in the BOLD response should correlate with trial-by-trial RT in a systematic way. 
Indeed, this is what Thielscher & Pessoa (2007) found; activity in the anterior cingulate, inferior 
frontal gyrus, and middle frontal gyrus correlated with response time such that longer RTs were 
associated with more activation. This runs counter to the argument presented by Heekeren, 
Marrett, Bandettini, & Ungerleider (2004), in which more activity in a decision area was thought 
to reflect a bigger difference in the two areas of comparison. If the brain area encoding one 
response (e.g., face) was significantly more active than the brain area encoding the competing 
response (e.g., house), the “decision” brain area would have an easier comparison and therefore  
an easier decision with most likely a faster response time. It is possible that both these theories 
are true, but simply represent different aspects of the decision process: signal detection via 
Heekeren et al. (2004) and some sort of continued processing via Thielscher & Pessoa (2007). 
Indeed, the region found by Heekeren et al. (2004) was in a separate area than the area found by 
Thielscher & Pessoa (2007), highlighting potential functional differences. This illustrates how 
elusive the process of decision-making can be, and further highlights the complexity of the 
process.  
The observation of an increased BOLD activation that correlates with longer response 
times inevitably arouses the suggestion of an area related to task demand or task difficulty. While 
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this does not preclude the area from involvement in the decision process, it does place certain 
boundaries on function. For example, when attempting to separate the temporal signatures of the 
decision process by using ERP during a face/object discrimination, Philiastides, Ratcliff, and 
Sajda (2006; see also Philiastides & Sajda, 2006) combined manipulation of difficulty within the 
task as well as difficulty between two tasks using the same phase-coherence shifted images. By 
using the scrambled images for both the difficult face/object and easy red/green discriminations, 
the researchers were able to separate the temporal signatures of visual areas responsive to the 
particular stimulus from general task difficulty areas. The results showed two points at which the 
ERP waveform separated dependent on condition. There was first an early component at 220ms 
that modulated based on task difficulty; there was increased negativity during the difficult 
face/object task with low coherence stimuli, but no increase in negativity during the easy 
face/object task with high coherence stimuli. Furthermore, when the low coherence stimuli were 
used in the easy red/green task (which did not require attention to details masked by the phase-
shift), the negativity did not appear. This lack of negativity during the easier decisions suggests 
that this early component was only indicative of task difficulty, not the decision process. 
However, since it is difficult to isolate the source of ERP waveforms, it is not possible to know 
whether or not this component overlaps with the increased activation seen by Thielscher & 
Pessoa (2007).  
Another interesting finding with the face/object paradigm was a late component (starting 
at 300ms) that appeared to correlate with response time. However, unlike the early component 
that modulated based on stimulus properties, the late component was present regardless of the 
coherence, suggesting it was not related to task difficulty. More importantly, the timing of onset 
for the late component was correlated with coherence level and the length of activity was 
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correlated with response time. By comparing these parameters with a diffusion model based on 
the behavioral data, the authors found that the activity in the late component was highly 
correlated with the mean drift rate proposed by the model for each trial. While this appears to 
suggest that the late component was indicative of an evidence accumulator, the authors were 
careful to note that the activity was not found during the red/green color categorization task; this 
means that either the activity was only strong enough to detect during more difficult tasks, or the 
activity was explicitly involved in the face/object discrimination similar to the early visual peaks 
they found rather than a general mechanism involved in decisions (Philiastides, Ratcliff, & 
Sajda, 2006). 
While ERP studies can lend some support for the relative timing of components, it is 
difficult and unreliable to identify the source of these components. This highlights the benefits of 
a multimodality approach across electrophysiological and neuroimaging methods. However, it is 
widely known that the underlying mechanics of fMRI do not easily fit into the discussion of 
timing within neural processes. Fortunately, recent studies have demonstrated that fMRI can be 
used to separate temporal signature given proper design and analysis techniques (Ploran et al., 
2007; Wheeler et al., 2008: Ploran, Tremel, Nelson, & Wheeler, submitted). By obscuring 
images of common objects, these studies were able to draw out the object recognition process for 
up to 14 seconds. Comparisons of recognitions that occurred after different lengths of time 
revealed that the process extends through a series of brain regions starting in occipital lobe, 
through parietal lobe, and finishing in frontal lobe. In addition to the breadth of activity, these 
studies also demonstrated different patterns of activity suggestive of varying stages of the 
decision process. Occipital areas contained a sustained level of activity throughout the trial, 
indicating constant sensory stimulation. Parietal and some frontal areas demonstrated growing 
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levels of activity that shifted in peak coinciding with the recognition response, suggesting the 
accumulation of evidence. Lastly, frontal and some subcortical areas were active transiently at 
the time of the decision, but not beforehand, indicating a tight coupling with response execution.  
In addition, these patterns remained despite a manipulation in which the object identity 
was not consistent during the trial (i.e., the available information was constantly changing). 
Despite the increased difficulty, activity in parietal and frontal areas continued to demonstrate an 
increasing pattern dependent on the timing of the response as participants attempted to recognize 
the object. Importantly, activity during these inconsistent trials was not any greater than trials 
during which object identification was consistent, ruling out that the activity was due to effort. 
These diverse patterns not only illustrative of how and when different brain areas may be 
involved in the process, but also demonstrate that fMRI can be a useful technique for 
investigating timing differences if the task is adapted appropriately. 
Collectively the neuroimaging studies on humans lend support to theory of perceptual 
decision described earlier, with information progressing through a series of stages (Figure 1). 
Changes in sensory areas related to the stimuli correlated with changes in anterior executive 
areas (Heekeren, Marrett, Bandettini, & Ungerleider, 2004). Additionally, there is evidence that 
sensory areas were active earlier than parietal and frontal areas that may be evaluating the 
incoming information for evidence towards the response (Philiastides, Ratcliff, & Sajda, 2006; 
Ploran et al., 2007; Ploran, Tremel, Nelson, & Wheeler, submitted). However, neuroimaging and 
electrophysiology highlighted activation in large areas of the brain. The lack of precision and 
general overlapping nature of neuroimaging results from a wide variety of studies can make 
interpretation of these results difficult. Before advancing further, it is important to understanding 
the types of changes certain manipulations to the stimulus and decision environment can create 
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in order to better predict where and when changes may occur in the brain. By creating strong a 
priori hypotheses about the processes and potential brain areas involved based on the results of 
behavioral studies, neuroimaging results will gain strength and stability. 
1.6 OPEN QUESTIONS AND OVERVIEW OF DOCUMENT 
Although the research on perceptual decisions has been extensive, it is not without 
shortcomings. For example, the use of the 90  control condition by Churchland, Kiani, & 
Shadlen (2008) caused changes in neural activity that may have represented the unintended 
effects of similarity. As this was not the focus of the study it was not examined further, yet 
leaves an interesting question as to how the similarity of response options (in this case a smaller 
angle of disparity between two possible directions of motion) may affect the extraction of 
evidence from incoming sensory information. Also, the limited attempt to examine how the 
number of responses alternatives affects the decision process (Leite & Ratcliff, 2010) failed to 
consider how the use of letters as stimuli creates comparison problems to the more quantifiably 
manipulable stimuli like color or brightness patches from previous experiments (Ratcliff & 
Rouder, 1998).  
This dissertation will address some of these shortcomings by systematically assessing 
aspects of perceptual decisions using a single quantifiable stimulus – random dot motion. The 
first experiment (2.0 ) will follow up on Churchland, Kiani, & Shadlen (2008) by testing how the 
similarity of two presented possible directions impacts the speed and accuracy of the decision 
process. The second experiment (3.0 ) will follow up on Leite & Ratcliff (2010) by testing 
whether increasing the number of choices to a greater extent continues to negatively impact 
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performance. The remaining two experiments will start to explore perceptual decisions in less 
predictable environments. The first will assess how delaying information towards a decision after 
the decision process has started affects overall accuracy and speed once the information is 
presented (4.0 ). This represents a potentially more realistic assessment of the process, as the 
environment does not always give cues to when information to be evaluated is forthcoming. The 
second will assess how altering the fidelity of evidence during the decision process affects the 
ultimate decision (5.0 ). This manipulation mimics previous studies in macaques (Huk & 
Shadlen, 2005) in an effort to bridge between the human behavioral and macaque 
neurophysiological literature. Finally, a trial-by-trial analysis of the data will assess whether 
performance changes based on previous trial characteristics such as accuracy, timing of 
evidence, or stimulus fidelity. This analysis will address whether perceptual decisions follow 
similar behavioral patterns to multiple attribute decisions, which see variability, or visual and 
spatial attention studies, which do not. These questions are characterized more fully below. 
1.6.1 Question #1 
Research in multiple attribute decisions has shown that similarity of the alternatives can 
affect decision processes (Biggs, Bedard, Gabor, & Linsmeier, 1985; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981). 
The study of perceptual decisions often uses a basic visual stimulus that varies along a single 
continuum (e.g., brightness). Sometimes these continuums are used to create stimuli that are 
difficult to discrimination (e.g., patches of almost equal brightness, Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998). 
More often, the continuum is ignored and choices reside at opposite ends of the scale (e.g., right 
vs. left motion in a variety of neurophysiological experiments such as Shadlen & Newsome, 
2001). Although there has been some interest in how similarity affects perceptual 
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discriminations, the limited studies have used letter tasks in which it is hard to quantify the 
similarity or manipulate it at fine grain levels (Ratcliff & Rouder, 2000). As mentioned above, 
one study which did start to capitalize on additional directions in the motion discrimination 
experiment found potentially interesting neurophysiological results that suggested a change in 
the process, but failed to fully explore the behavioral and neural results.  
2.0 discusses an experiment that investigated the effect of similarity of options, in this 
case possible directions of motion, on accuracy and reaction time. It was predicted that as 
alternatives become more similar, the decision process must evaluate increasingly overlapping 
pools of neurons. The overlapping activity would then result in more time needed to make a 
decision with less accuracy. The results demonstrate that alternatives must be highly similar in 
order to affect decision processes. However, once there is a high enough similarity, performance 
is affected in both accuracy and reaction time measures. 
1.6.2 Question #2 
Until recently, the majority of perceptual decision experiments to date involve binary 
choices (c.f., Churchland, Kiani, & Shadlen, 2008; Leite & Ratcliff, 2010). While prior stimulus-
response studies have demonstrated a linear relationship between number of possible stimulus 
and speed of response (Hyman 1953), this does not capture the process that occurs when stimuli 
are ambiguous and do not require a conditioned response. In order to understand the naturalist ic 
dynamics of decision making, it is necessary to test how increased available response alternatives 
affect decision times. Assessing decision time as a function of response number will determine 
whether large numbers of options are all taken into consideration, or whether the response set is 
strategically reduced prior to the commitment to a decision. A linear increase in decision time 
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with number of options would support the former, similar to the linear increase in memory 
search times with set-size increases found in the Sternberg task (Sternberg, 1966) and the 
stimulus-response paradigm (Hyman, 1953). On the other hand, a selective strategy might be 
used to eliminate clearly wrong answers, focusing assessment on the most likely answers (Payne, 
Bettmann, & Johnson, 1988). This may create non-linear asymptotic changes in speed as the 
number of response alternatives increases.  
3.0 discusses an experiment in which 2-, 4-, and 8-choice versions of the motion 
discrimination paradigm were tested. Competing hypotheses predict that participants will either 
adopt strategies to mitigate the increasing evaluation load (by potentially eliminating obvious 
non-choices or other means), thus saving reaction time and performance from detriment as 
choices increase. On the other hand, participants may not adopt strategies and instead spread the 
decision process to vet each new response alternative, resulting in longer decision times and 
lower accuracy. The results suggest that increasing the number of possible response alternatives 
does affect both accuracy and reaction time, though not necessarily simultaneously. Increasing 
choices from 2 to 4 options decreased accuracy despite similar reaction times, whereas 
increasing from 4 to 8 choices both decreased accuracy and increased reaction time. A discussion 
of how increasing the number of choices and the accompanying increase in similarity of those 
choices is included. 
1.6.3 Question #3 
Previous studies of perceptual decisions appear to fall into two procedural categories: 
brief, isolated presentations of stimuli (e.g., Ratcliff, 2002; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001) or 
continuous presentations of stimuli until response (e.g., Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Roitman & 
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Shadlen, 2002). Importantly, past studies have used a predictable relationship between the start 
of a trial and the presentation of the stimulus with minimal variation within an experiment (c.f., 
Green, Smith, & von Gierke, 1983). However, the decision process should be able to handle a 
dynamic environment in which evidence occurs at any point past the initial knowledge of its 
impending arrival. In addition, it has been shown that time constraints can affect strategy 
selection in decision making (Payne, Bettmann, & Johnson, 1988). This leads to the open 
question of whether the timing of incoming evidence after search onset affects the speed with 
which a decision is made. If so, how does early information get incorporated into the longer 
decision process? 
Two experiments were conducted to test this question. 4.0 describes an experiment in 
which the informative stimulus was presented at varying times in an otherwise random 
background to test isolated effects of timing. If the decision process involves a timeout function 
to limit the spending of mental resources on an unsuccessful evaluation, reaction times should 
max out across conditions in which information is presented very late in the trial. If there is no 
timeout function to preserve resources, there should be no change in performance levels once 
information is presented. The results demonstrate a decrease in accuracy and a decrease in 
reaction time as the decision extends in time. Two different theories that might account for these 
results are discussed.  
In addition, 5.0 describes an experiment in which bursts of highly informative or highly 
misleading information are embedded early in the trial. It was predicted that altering the fidelity 
of information early in the trial should influence the overall process, but not cause an immediate 
termination. This should create faster, more accurate responses when the highly informative 
evidence agrees with the correct response, but slower, less accurate responses when it is 
 35 
contrary. The results present a complicated pattern whereby the ongoing mix of trials throughout 
each block appeared to inform strategy selection as the participant moved through the task. 
1.6.4 Question #4 
Prior experiments on effort and achievement behavior have suggested that completion of 
the current trial can be dependent on the difficulty, success, and other characteristics of the prior 
trial (Thomas, 1983). Given variability in perceptual stimuli, it is possible that the decision 
process adapts continuously according to recent trial performance. If this is true, reaction time 
and accuracy should fluctuate depending on characteristics of the previous trial, including 
successful completion and stimulus characteristics. Conversely, studies of temporal and spatial 
attention have not shown trial-by-trial variability in responses, and instead demonstrate that 
performance on a given trial is the direct result of variability of the stimulus within the trial (Vul, 
Hanus, & Kanwisher, 2009).   
6.0 explores the possibility of trial-by-trial shifts in strategy by reanalyzing data from the 
4 experiments contained in earlier chapters based on previous trial characteristics such as 
accuracy, speed, and trial status (e.g., informative burst of information vs. misleading burst of 
information). If participants were adjusting their strategy as suggested by work on multiple 
attribute decisions, there should be shifts in performance associated with the status of the 
previous trial. The results suggest that this may be partially true when participants are presented 
with feedback, as shown through changes in performance based on previous trial accuracy during 
the burst experiment (5.0 ). However, there were no trial-by-trial shifts in performance based on 
previous trial characteristics, for example whether or not the previous trial contained an 
informative or anti-informative burst of evidence. These paradoxical results highlight the need to 
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further assess perceptual decisions behaviorally before attempting to understand the neural 
underpinnings. If the parameters of the decision are changing based on characteristics of the 
previous trial, hypotheses regarding brain activity should also change. 
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2.0  POINT OF PERCEPTUAL BREAK AND EFFECTS OF SIMILARITY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The visual system is highly effective at identifying stimuli and does so through a series of 
specialized downstream regions for particular types of visual input (Ungerleider & Mishkin, 
1982). For example, areas MT in the macaque and a homologue in humans (V5; Tootell & 
Taylor, 1995) have been shown to process motion stimuli (e.g., direction of a moving stimulus) 
(Newsome & Pare, 1988; Britten & Newsome, 1998). The physiology of this area will partially 
determine the downstream effects of the perceptual decision process regarding the random dot 
motion paradigm used throughout this document. Neurons in the middle temporal lobe fire 
preferentially to stimuli moving in a particular direction; however, there are variations in firing 
rate dependent on the level of coherence (Britten, Shadlen, Newsome, & Movshon, 1992). As the 
level of coherence decreases, and in turn the amount of noise present in the stimulus increases, 
preferential firing does not meet the same level of activity as when the stimulus has high 
coherence. Additionally, the ability to predict the impending behavioral choice regarding 
direction of motion from any one neuron begins to fail as coherence decreases. This suggests that 
decisions regarding motion at low levels of coherence must arrive from the integration of activity 
over a pool of neurons with similar direction sensitivity (Britten, Newsome, Shadlen, Celebrini, 
& Movshon, 1996). However, although these neuronal pools demonstrate a high rate of firing for 
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the preferred stimulus, they also respond at reduced levels to directions adjacent to the preferred 
direction. Importantly, these tuning curves broaden as the coherence of the stimulus decreases 
(Britten & Newsome, 1998). This means that at low levels of coherence, the activity caused by a 
near-preferred stimulus will be closer to the activity caused by the preferred stimulus than if the 
two were presented at a higher coherence, potentially resulting in high levels of interference 
between pools during the evaluation stage of the decision process. The results from Britten & 
Newsome (1998) demonstrate that for a narrowly tuned neuron, activity falls by 50% of the peak 
amount for a stimulus 30  off the preferred direction when presented at 100% coherence. Yet, 
when coherence is decreased to 25.6% (the closest coherence level to the current studies), 
activity for the same 30  offset stimulus drops by approximately 10%. This variance in the 
sensitivity of the tuning curve has direct implications for the ability of the participant to 
accurately discriminate the direction of motion. 
Before using the random dot motion paradigm for the remaining experiments, it is 
important to test the ability of participants to adequately (i.e., significantly above chance) 
discriminate the directions of motion within the display even at low coherences. The display 
used throughout the experiments in this dissertation is a stochastic random dot display that 
replots 1000 dots in a random fashion, with a specified subset moving in one direction together. 
Experiments hereafter will use 45  increments and greater as the minimum degree difference 
between options. The goal of this experiment is to identify the direction detection threshold in 
human participants using our random dot display.  The hypothesis is that the threshold will be 
below 45 degrees of visual angle (the minimum angle used in the remaining experiments) based 
on the neurophysiological data described above and behavioral piloting results in the lab that 
have demonstrated above chance performance at 45  disparity. To assess this formally, the 
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current experiment will test discrimination with two response alternatives at 22.5 , 45 , 67.5 , 
and 90  in disparity from one another.  
A secondary goal of this experiment is to examine how changes in the similarity of the 
response options in this paradigm influences the accuracy and speed of discriminations. Previous 
studies have demonstrated that increasing the similarity of options can affect performance in 
both accuracy and reaction time. For example, similar letters (e.g., E and F) require more time to 
discriminate and result in lower accuracy compared to dissimilar letters (e.g., E and C; Ratcliff & 
Rouder, 2000). In addition, previous neurophysiological work using the stochastic random dot 
motion paradigm tested 90  discriminations compared to 180  discriminations. This resulted in 
slower neural firing buildup and slower reaction times, suggesting a more difficult decision 
(Churchland, Kiani, & Shadlen, 2008). The neurophysiological data suggests a potential 
mechanism by which similarity affects performance. As the options become more similar to each 
other, the potential for the comparison of overlapping neural pools increases. As described 
above, motion stimuli near the perceptual threshold for discrimination have the potential to 
activate more neurons due to the wide tuning curves (Britten & Newsome, 1998). In addition, 
studies of primary visual cortex have demonstrated that in certain perceptual discrimination 
tasks, perceptual ability relies on the steep slopes on either side of the tuning curve rather than 
the peak (Butts & Goldman, 2006). If activity occurs in a set of neurons that overlap from pools 
that code similar directions of motion, discrimination ability may suffer.  
There are two possible ways this might affect performance. The first way is if perceptual 
decisions occur due to a simple passing of threshold mechanism (Mazurek, Roitman, Ditterich, 
& Shadlen, 2003); in this case, increasing similarity will likely result in decreases in accuracy 
but not reaction time. The activity from the neuronal pools will still occur at the same fidelity, 
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with one reaching the threshold prior to the other. However, if the two options are so similar that 
the pools overlap, the wrong pool may reach threshold first due to variation in neural spiking 
(Butts & Goldman, 2006; Figure 4). The second way is if discrimination occurs through a brain 
area (the “comparator”) that compares the relative activity in the pools that code the presented 
options (Heekeren, Marrett, Bandettini, & Ungerleider, 2004; Lo & Wang, 2006; Kiani, Hanks, 
& Shadlen, 2006). In this case, both accuracy and reaction time may be affected. During an easy 
discrimination (i.e., the compared pools do not overlap in preference), the comparator will 
increase in activity quickly, pass threshold, and designate the pool with greater activity as the 
winner (Figure 5a, comparing either the solid bars to each other or the striped bars). If the 
comparison is difficult (e.g., the activity in the two pools of neurons under comparison are very 
close in activity; Figure 5b), an executive function of the comparator may be to delay the 
decision in order to gather more information about the stimulus. Once the comparator passes 
threshold, the decision is executed in favor of the pool with more activity. 
The results of this experiment should shed light on which of these two possibilities may 
be in action during perceptual decisions based on the resulting changes in performance as 
similarity increases. However, although decreases in accuracy may be expected by the increasing 
similarity of the options, performance in the 45  should remain significantly above chance levels 
in order to validate the use of that angle of disparity as the minimum between alternatives for the 
remaining experimental designs. 
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Figure 4. Examples of overlapping neural pools and the resulting decision process. 
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Figure 5. Example of resulting activity in a comparator brain area depending on similarity 
of alternatives. (a) Two examples of an easy decision: either the solid bars or the slashed 
bars are compared with each other, causing a high level of activity in the comparator 
region due to the large difference in activity between the red and green selective areas; (b) 
Example of a difficult decision that results in low activity in the comparator and would 
require more information before triggering a response. Note that both comparisons in (a) 
would result in the same amount of activity in the comparator, highlighting a problem with 
this theoretical approach. 
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2.2 METHODS 
2.2.1 Participants 
Forty-one healthy young adults (ages 18-25 years) were recruited from the Introduction to 
Psychology participant pool at the University of Pittsburgh. Participants were tested in groups of 
7-22 in a computer lab, with each seated at their own computer. The experiment lasted one hour 
and participants received one credit towards their course requirement. Prior to beginning the 
experiment, all participants completed a consent form approved by the Internal Review Board at 
the University of Pittsburgh. Data from 4 participants was removed for chance performance that 
indicated a misunderstanding of the task. 
2.2.2 Materials  
The experiment was conducted using EPrime software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, 
PA) on Dell computers. The display presented white dots on a black screen contained within a 
circle of space approximately 4” in diameter; a fixation cross was in the middle of the circle. The 
dots were replotted in a random direction at a rate 60Hz. The experimenter could control both the 
direction and coherence (i.e., how many dots were moving together in the same direction) of the 
display. To indicate the options on a particular trial, “1” and “0” were presented at locations 
adjacent to the circular motion frame in a location found by drawing a straight line from the 
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center of the circle to the frame in the desired direction. Participants used a standard keyboard 
for response. 
2.2.3 Design  
Discriminations were made between 22.5 , 45 , 67.5 , and 90  pairs. The correct motion could 
be in any of 16 directions, starting at 0  (upward) through 337.5  in 22.5  increments. The other 
response option (the “comparator”) could be in either the clockwise or counterclockwise 
direction. This resulted in a 16 (direction of motion) x 4 (degree of difference) design. The 
number indicating the correct response was randomly selected to reduce any bias effects. Due to 
the large number of trials this creates, and in order to get a sufficient number of trials in the 22.5  
and 45  conditions to accurately assess the discrimination ability for the remaining experiments, 
trials were selected randomly from probability distributions with greater probabilities for 
selection of the higher similarity trials but equal probabilities for each direction of motion as the 
correct response.  
2.2.4 Procedure  
After completing the consent form, participants were given brief verbal instructions on the basic 
aspects of experiment including the task and response options. Participants were asked to place 
the index finger of their right hand on the “0” key of the number line at the top of the keyboard 
and the index finger of their left hand on the “1” key at the other end of the number line. These 
fingers were to remain in place throughout the experiment, and the experimenter reminded 
participants who removed their fingers from these locations throughout the session.  
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Participants then read a series of screens reiterating the verbal instructions about the task 
and were prompted to ask any questions they may have. Then they were given 10 practice trials 
designed to acclimate them to the task. The first trial was conducted at a high coherence level 
(80%), and succeeding trials decreased in coherence until the final three trials were given at the 
25% coherence level that remained throughout the rest of the experiment (selection of 25% 
coherence was based on prior behavioral testing that demonstrated this level to elicit a variety of 
performance levels across participants that is neither at floor or ceiling). At the end of the 
practice session participants were again prompted to ask the experimenter any questions 
regarding the task they may have. If they did not have any questions, they proceeded with the 
experiment. 
The experiment was divided into 8 blocks of 40 to 56 trials (an earlier version of the 
experiment (N = 15) had a shorter trial duration that allowed for more trials per block; this led to 
a high number of no-response trials so the trial length was increased for the remaining 
participants to increase responses). At the beginning of each block, participants read an 
instruction screen that reminded them of the response options; they pressed the space bar to 
advance to the block of trials. Blocks lasted approximately 6 minutes in duration, after which a 
screen instructed participants to briefly rest their eyes before moving on to the next block. 
Each trial consisted of two parts. The first part was a 2000ms fixation period, during 
which the fixation cross was red in color and the dots were set to all move randomly. Participants 
had been previously instructed to not respond during these periods, as there was no direction 
possible when the fixation cross was red. The second part of the trial was a 6000ms motion 
period (4000ms in the earlier version) during which the fixation cross turned white and the dots 
were set to 25% coherence towards the selected direction. The “0” and “1” white markers for 
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response options were displayed in the appropriate locations around the circular motion frame 
dependent on the condition at the start of the 6000ms motion period (Figure 6). Participants were 
instructed to respond during this period with the response option they believed corresponded 
with the overall motion of the dots. Trials lasted the entire 6000ms (or 4000ms) period despite 
earlier responses. No feedback on performance was given. 
2.2.5 Data Scoring and Sorting  
Each trial was marked based on the response. There were four potential responses: correct 
(response matched the marker for the correct choice), incorrect (response matched the marker for 
the incorrect choice), fixation (a response was made in the fixation period prior to the trial), or no 
response. Trials with fixation responses or no response were removed from the analysis. Trials 
with correct and incorrect responses also had an associated reaction time that was calculated by 
the amount of time between the start of the coherent stimulus and the button press in response. 
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Figure 6. Timeline illustrating two trials of the perceptual break experiment. 
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2.3 RESULTS 
2.3.1 Accuracy 
Overall accuracy was high (M = 88.4%, SD = 6.6), indicating that participants were able to learn 
the task. Performance on the increasing similarity of options is shown in Figure 7. A repeated-
measures ANOVA was used to analyze the accuracy rates for the degree of difference (4 
conditions; 90 , 67.5 , 45 , and 22.5 ), the correct direction of motion (16 conditions; 0  to 
337.5  in 22.5  increments), and the interaction between the two variables. The main effect of 
degree of difference between response options was significant (F(3,99) = 61.881, p < .001). 
Accuracy for the 22.5  condition (M = 79.8%, SE = 2.0) was significantly lower than all other 
comparison conditions (P < .001 for all pairwise comparisons). In addition, the 45  condition (M 
= 91.2%, SE = 1.2) was significantly lower than the 90  condition (M = 93.9%, SE = 1.0; p = 
.01). However, the 67.5  condition (M = 93.6%, SE = 1.0) was not significantly different from 
either the 45  or 90  conditions. This demonstrates that at fine levels of similarity (22.5  
difference in response options), accuracy begins to decline. However, larger degrees of 
difference have less or no effect on performance. 
The main effect of direction for the correct option was also significant (F(15,495) = 
4.521, p < .001; Figure 8). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons indicate that this effect is driven by 
the 135  (M = 84.5%, SE = 2.1) and 315  (M = 83.8%, SE = 2.2) directions, which are 
significantly different from 0  (M = 94.3%, SE = 1.3) and 180  (M = 93.4%, SE = 1.3)(p < .01 
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for all four pairwise comparisons). In addition, the 315  condition is also significantly different 
from trials in which 22.5  is correct, (M = 92.3%, SE = 1.3; p =.01) and 270  is correct (M = 
91.9%, SE = 1.2; p = .05). All other pairwise comparisons were not significant, indicating that 
aside from the 135  and 315  conditions, there was not a bias in favor or against particular 
directions of motion. 
The interaction between degree of difference and direction of correct motion was also 
significant (F(45,1485) = 2.02, p < .001). This again is driven by the 135  and 315  conditions in 
which the 90  comparisons for these directions decrease in accuracy compared to the 67.5  
comparisons (86.5% vs. 89.5% and 83.6% vs. 90.2% respectively). Although this suggests there 
was an error in experimental coding, no error could be found. 
2.3.2 Reaction Time 
Responses were on average made about halfway through the trial (M = 2162.67ms, SD = 
407.25). A repeated-measures ANOVA was used to analyze the reaction times for the degree of 
difference (4 conditions; 90 , 67.5 , 45 , and 22.5 ), the correct direction of motion (16 
conditions; 0  to 337.5  in 22.5  increments), and the interaction between the two variables. The 
main effect of degree of difference between response options was significant (F(3,99) = 32.17, p 
< .001). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons reveal the same effects as for accuracy. The 22.5  
difference between response options (M = 2250.14ms, SE = 65.44) took significantly longer than 
all other differences (all comparisons p < .001). In addition, the 45  condition (M = 2051.57ms, 
SE = 64.52) took significantly longer than the 90  condition (M = 1962.25ms, SE = 57.87; p = 
.02). The 67.5  condition (M = 2025.30ms, SE = 59.09) was not different from either the 45  or 
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90  conditions (Figure 9). This increase in reaction time as options became more similar suggests 
that the decision process requires more time, and therefore potentially more information as it 
accumulates over time, than when the options are further apart. 
The main effect of correct direction of motion was also significant (F(15,495) = 4.78, p < 
.001). This appears to be driven by shorter reaction times for stimuli on the vertical axis (up, M = 
1930.19ms, SE = 69.02; down, M = 1872.48, SE = 55.91) compared to directions off the vertical 
axis. These effects are summarized in Figure 10. In addition, there was a significant difference 
between the 270  (M = 2010.51ms, SE = 73.93) and 292.5  (M = 2205.56ms, SE = 75.79; p = 
.03). The shorter reaction times for stimuli on the vertical axis suggests a processing preference, 
as has been previously demonstrated in object recognition (the “oblique effect”; see Appelle, 
1972 for review). 
The interaction between degree of difference and the motion of the correct direction was 
not significant (F(45,1485) = 1.159, p = .22). All directions of motion had increasing reaction 
times as similarity increased.  
 51 
     
Figure 7. Accuracy as a function of angle of disparity. 
 
 
Figure 8. Accuracy as a function of direction of motion (0  is up, 90  is right). 
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Figure 9. Reaction time as a function of similarity. 
 
Figure 10. Reaction time as a function of direction of motion (0  is up, 90  is right). 
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2.4 DISCUSSION 
The results demonstrate only minor changes in performance at angles of disparity of 45  or 
greater, with the effect of similarity only significantly decreasing accuracy and increasing 
reaction time at very high levels of similarity (22.5  angle of disparity between the two possible 
response options). However, these changes to both measures of performance agree with the 
effects of response option similarity found in research on both perceptual decisions (Ratcliff & 
Rouder, 2000) and higher levels of decision making (e.g., medical diagnosis based on a list of 
symptoms; Biggs, Bedard, Gaber, & Linsmeier, 1985). In addition, the changes in response time 
directly agree with previous work with the random dot motion task in behavioral (Ball & 
Sekuler, 1980) and neurophysiological (Churchland, Kiani, & Shadlen, 2008) studies. Although 
increasing the similarity of choices did not appear to affect accuracy and reaction time in a linear 
fashion, it is likely due to the large grain size of the comparisons. As the degree of difference 
decreased down to 45  and 22.5 , performance began to decrease in accuracy and increase in 
reaction time. Had the degree of difference between possible options decreased even further 
(e.g., 11.25  between response options), the pools of neurons involved in the decision (Mazurek, 
Roitman, Ditterich, & Shadlen, 2003) would involve higher overlap in tuning. In that case, it is 
likely that the effects would have grown larger.  
It is possible that the motion stimulus does not have enough variation in order to induce 
these similarity differences. Since coherence was kept constant in order to equate neural activity 
levels across comparisons, the only attribute altered was the degree of difference between the 
options. Previous studies of similarity in decision making have often used multiple attribute 
contexts (like medical diagnoses based on a variety of symptoms; Biggs, Bedard, Gaber, & 
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Linsmeier, 1985), but the motion stimulus does not have as many degrees of freedom. This lack 
of variety may constrain the extent to which similarity can have an affect in the current context. 
While the effect of similarity was an important secondary goal of this experiment, the 
primary goal was to test whether or not the remaining experiments would be compromised by the 
minimum 45  angle of disparity between response options when 8 options are presented. The 
high performance rate in the 45  condition confirmed that the difference is distinguishable and 
therefore able to be used in the remaining experiments. However, there was a significant change 
in performance between the 90  and 45  conditions, so caution will be taken when discussing 
changes in performance when there are also changes in the angle of disparity between response 
options (e.g., between the 4-choice and 8-choice conditions in 3.0 ). In addition, there appears to 
be a bias towards motion along the vertical axis, particularly in the speed of decisions. While all 
the experiments use counterbalancing to avoid these effects overall, any indication that direction 
of motion is affecting the results above the intended manipulations in the remaining studies will 
be examined in a separate analysis. 
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3.0  INCREASING CHOICES 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter investigated how increasing the similarity of options might affect 
reaction time and accuracy. The results indicated that similarity might not affect performance 
until the identified alternatives are highly similar (e.g., 22.5  in disparity or less for the present 
paradigm). While the effect was not as strong as hoped, it still demonstrated that aspects of the 
response options themselves might affect the decision process. In addition to similarity between 
possible response options, it is also likely that the number of available options could make a 
difference in performance. In simple stimulus-response paradigms, increasing the number of 
possible items to be displayed increased reaction time linearly (Hyman, 1953). This suggests that 
processing slowed as there are more associations to consider upon stimulus presentation. 
However, stimulus-response paradigms do not require interpretation of the stimulus, necessarily. 
If the stimulus is presented unambiguously (i.e., without added noise or disruption), it is a matter 
of conditioned execution of the correct response. The current chapter examines how increasing 
the number of possible response options affects the speed of interpretation and execution of a 
decision for an ambiguous perceptual stimulus. 
The majority of previous studies on perceptual decisions require a choice between two 
dichotomous options (e.g., face/house, Heekeren, Marrett, Bandettini, & Ungerleider, 2004; 
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face/car, Philiastides & Sajda, 2007; Philiastides, Ratcliff, & Sajda, 2006). However, we do not 
always have the benefit of determining binary decisions. The primary goal of this experiment is 
to test how the increase from 2 response alternatives to more (in the present experiment, 4 or 8 
alternatives) affects both accuracy and reaction time. While this does not assess completely blind 
decisions in which the number of alternatives is unknown or infinite (e.g., object identification), 
it should begin to establish how performance changes as possibilities increase under controlled 
conditions. As mentioned above, increasing the number of items in the stimulus-response 
paradigm slowed responses but did not change accuracy (Hyman, 1953). However, the lack of a 
change in accuracy appears to be largely due to the task instructions, which required a low error 
rate and specific timing of responses after the stimulus was presented. In fact, the design of 
Hyman’s experiment was an attempt to adjust the task based on changes in accuracy in an earlier 
paper (Hick, 1952) that he believed failed to capture the true effect because it allowed for 
strategies that increased speed and errors at the same time. Therefore, without the strict response 
instructions (i.e., accuracy is unconstrained in the current experiment), it will be interesting to 
see if increasing the number of response alternatives in an ambiguous stimulus situation affects 
both reaction time and accuracy, as has been found in 4-choice decision tasks (Churchland, 
Kiani, & Shadlen, 2008; Leite & Ratcliff, 2010). 
Although increasing the number of response alternatives in this type of motion 
discrimination experiment inevitably increases the similarity of the alternatives, the previous 
experiment demonstrated that there is only a slight decrease in performance from a 90  to a 45  
angle of disparity in two-choice decisions. Therefore it seems safe to assume that as long as the 
minimum degree of difference between alternatives is 45 , there should not be adverse affects of 
the increase in similarity in addition to the increasing number of alternatives. Just as the previous 
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experiment began to find decreases in accuracy and increases in reaction time as similarity 
increases, it is expected that adding response alternatives will create similar results. However, 
because the 45  difference condition did not large changes in performance, changes in the 
current experiment above those levels can be attributed to the addition of response alternatives 
instead of similarity.  
 It is expected that response time will increase as there are more alternatives to vet (Leite 
& Ratcliff, 2010; Churchland, Kiani, & Shadlen, 2008). There are two potential increasing 
patterns. First, response time may increase in a linear fashion with the number of alternatives, 
demonstrating that each added alternative adds a constant load to the process, similar to the 
results of the stimulus-response paradigm (Hyman, 1953). This appears to be true for when 
moving across 2-, 3-, and 4-choice decisions (Leite & Ratcliff, 2010), but it is unclear how this 
will extend to 8-choice trials. Therefore, the second possibility is that response time may reach a 
plateau as alternatives increase as the subjects adopt a decision strategy (e.g., use of early 
information to eliminate clear non-options on a particular trial to reduce number of alternatives; 
Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988). Previous decision research has shown the use of preference 
trees as a fast way to eliminate improbable options when considering decisions with multiple 
relevant aspects (Tversky & Sattath, 1979); it is possible that a similar heuristic may be used 
during simple perceptual decisions. The pattern of reaction times based on the number of 
possible options should dissociate these two theories. A consistent linear increase in reaction 
time as the number of alternatives increases will support the theory that each alternative adds a 
consistent amount of processing to the cognitive load (Figure 11, solid line). On the other hand, 
if the increase in reaction time slows or reaches a plateau, a strategy account will be supported 
(Figure 11, dashed line).  
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Figure 11. Predicted differences in reaction time depending on either a consistent load with 
each new alternative or strategy adoption. 
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A secondary goal of this experiment is to gauge whether or not strategy towards the task 
changes as the stimulus space is crowded with more possible options. Previous research in 
decision making suggests that people use heuristics or strategies to solve difficult decisions 
quickly (Tversky & Sattath, 1979; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988). 
As the number of possible alternative increases, it is likely that participants are adopting one or 
more strategies to simplify the problem space. These strategies may include ruling out obvious 
non-options, dividing the problem space a priori to bin evidence quickly, or starting with certain 
biases towards the probability of one result over the others. This will be assessed by subjective 
feedback on strategy approach, with questions directed at these possibilities.  
A final goal of this experiment is to test how the requirements for response output might 
affect speed and accuracy. Previous experiments on perceptual decisions have used a single 
button to indicate the discrimination, which may leave doubt as to the veracity of the decision 
(Ploran et al., 2007; Ploran et al., in preparation). While the previous experiments on object 
recognition did garner enough error trials to conduct a separate analysis (Wheeler et al., 2008), 
there remains concern that without a definitive option-related response output the decision is 
made under slightly different conditions (e.g., a lower threshold for making the initial response 
because there is less concern regarding performance). In theory, while there might be marginal 
differences in reaction time based on different motor output (one button responses might be 
faster than selection of the appropriate button out of up to 8 options), accuracy should be similar. 
However, this assumes that participants are not motivated to boost their reported accuracy in the 
one-button version of the task (see Methods). The following experiment will examine how the 
reported accuracy in the one-button version of the task compares to actual accuracy computed 
through definitive response options. It will also assess the potential timing differences between 
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using one motor action to respond versus several motor actions, each associated with a unique 
response option.  
3.2 METHODS 
3.2.1 Participants 
Seventy-one healthy young adults (ages 18-25 years) were recruited from the Introduction to 
Psychology participant pool at the University of Pittsburgh. Participants were tested in groups of 
7-22 in a computer lab, with each seated at their own computer. The experiment lasted one hour 
and participants received one credit towards their course requirement. Prior to beginning the 
experiment, all participants completed a consent form approved by the Internal Review Board at 
the University of Pittsburgh. 
One set of participants (N = 20) was tested in the one-button version; one participant was 
removed from the analysis for performance outside 2 standard deviations below the mean. 
Another set of participants (N = 27) was tested in the definitive response version of the 
experiment. Data for two participants was removed for performance outside 2 standard 
deviations below the mean that indicated a misunderstanding of the task or response options. A 
final set of participants (N = 24) was also tested on the one-button version of the experiment; in 
addition, these participants were given a strategy assessment at the end of the session. 
Unfortunately, due to experimental error, the accuracy and reaction time data for these 
participants is unusable, but the strategy assessments remain intact. 
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3.2.2 Materials  
The experiment was conducted using EPrime software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, 
PA) on Dell computers. Responses were made via the keyboard attached to the computer. The 
display presented white dots on a black screen contained within a circle of space approximately 
4” in diameter; a fixation cross was in the middle of the circle. The dots were replotted in a 
random direction at a rate of 60 Hz. The experimenter could control both the direction and 
coherence (i.e., how many dots were moving together in the same direction) of the display.  
3.2.3 Design  
Trials were broken into blocks with instructions indicating whether the block would include 2, 4, 
or 8 choices. In the 2- and 4-choice conditions, the instructions also indicated the possible 
directions of the choices (e.g., up/down or left/right). Only the vertical and horizontal axes were 
used in the 2-choice condition; the 4-choice condition used the cardinal directions in one case 
(i.e., up, down, left, and right) and the diagonal directions in another case. In order to equate and 
counterbalance the number of occurrences per each response choice (e.g., left) in the 4- and 8-
choice blocks, the number of trials and number of blocks were different for each number of 
choices. There were two 2-choice blocks with 20 trials each, three 4-choice blocks with 28 trials 
each, and four 8-choice blocks with 32 trials each. This resulted in blocks approximately 3 to 6 
minutes in length.  
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3.2.4 Procedure 
After reading and signing consent forms according to the rules of the Internal Review Board at 
the University of Pittsburgh, participants were verbally instructed about the basic aspects of the 
experiment including a description of the experiment, task, and response options. Participants 
then read a series of instruction screens reiterating the verbal instructions and were prompted to 
ask questions if necessary. They then started a three-minute practice session containing 10 trials 
in the 8-choice version of the experiment. The coherence level started at 80% for the first trial 
and shifted down in increments to 25% for the last three trials in order to acclimate the 
participants to the task. After completing the practice session participants were again prompted 
to ask any questions they may have regarding the task. They then proceeded into the experiment 
and responded according to their particular instructions and trial structure, elaborated below. 
After completion of the experiment, participants were thanked for their time and allowed to leave 
the computer lab. 
3.2.5 One-button Version 
In this version of the experiment, participants responded using the Space bar and the task 
structure was slightly different. The trial started with 2000ms of random motion and a red 
fixation cross; the period of motion designated by the white fixation cross was broken into two 
parts. The first part was 6000 ms of motion at 25% coherence during which participants were 
instructed to press the Space bar when they were pretty confident as to the direction of motion. 
After the 6000 ms allowed for the initial decision, 2000 ms of 90% coherent motion was 
presented for the participants to verify their response. If their initial guess was correct, 
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participants pressed the Space bar again. If their initial guess was incorrect, participants did not 
make a second response. Verbal instructions prior to the experiment emphasized the likelihood 
of incorrect responses and stressed the need to be honest over the need to report high accuracy.  
3.2.6 Definitive Response Version 
In this version of the experiment, participants responded using the number pad on the right side 
of the keyboard. Instructions designated the “8” key as up, the “2” key as down, the “6” key as 
right, the “4” key as left, and the remaining “1”, “3”, “7”, and “9” keys as the respective diagonal 
directions. Participants were to rest their right index finger on the “5” key (in the middle of the 
pad) and press the appropriate button to indicate the direction of motion on each trial.  
Each trial began with 2000ms of 0% coherence motion with a red fixation cross. 
Participants had been instructed that periods with a red fixation cross were at 0% coherence and 
therefore did not require a response as there was no motion present. The fixation cross then 
changed to white for 8000 ms and the coherence level was raised to 25%. Depending on the 
block, the direction of motion was randomly selected from among the possible choices, with 
equal numbers of trials per direction chosen throughout the block. Participants responded by 
pressing the appropriate button on the number pad as described above. 
3.2.7 Strategy Assessment 
A portion of the participants was asked to report their general task strategy at the end of the 
experiment. The debriefing questionnaire began with general open-ended questions regarding 
confidence level at the decision point for each block type. It then presented several options for 
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how participants might have divided the visual space in order to complete the task effectively in 
the 2- and 4-choice blocks (the 8-choice condition was left out due to time constraints; Section 
1.01(a)(i)Appendix B). Participants were asked to give a percentage for each option as to how 
close it was to their actual strategy. The questionnaire presented several complementary pairs of 
strategies for the 2- and 4-choice versions to investigate whether participants maintained a 
similar strategy across blocks or changed strategies according to the number of options. 
3.3 RESULTS 
3.3.1 One-Button Version – Accuracy 
Overall performance was extremely high (M = 91.47%, SD = 8.15), indicating there may be 
some motivation to misreport accuracy. A repeated-measures ANOVA found that the main effect 
of number of choices was not significant (F(2,38) = 2.23, p = .12). Accuracy was similar in the 
2-choice (M = 91.31%, SD = 12.72), 4-choice (M = 88.57%, SD = 12.54), and 8-choice (M = 
90.47%, SD = 10.29). As already mentioned, this suggests some motivation (or lack of 
motivation) to misreport accuracy and complete the task dishonestly. 
3.3.2 One-Button Version – Reaction Time 
Overall reaction times were well within the 6000ms of motion during the trial prior to the 
2000ms verification stage (M = 2154.44ms, SD = 553.46). However, a repeated-measures 
ANOVA found that the main effect of number of choices was not significant (F(2,36) = .373, p = 
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.69). The 2-choice (M = 2194.10, SD = 679.37), 4-choice (M = 2123.31, SD = 642.31), and 8-
choice (M = 2186.56, SD = 495.25) were all similar in speed. It is unclear why reaction times did 
not change. Even if participants were misreporting accuracy, there could still be some changes in 
the initial response phase. It is likely that participants, realizing that accuracy was self-reported, 
weren’t bothering to attend to the task at all, causing faster responses in which the participants’ 
were not as confident as required for the definitive response version. 
3.3.3 Definitive Response Version - Accuracy 
Overall performance was high (M = 82.06%, SD = 14.92), indicating that participants were able 
to complete the task effectively. Unlike the one-button version, a repeated-measures ANOVA 
found that the main effect of number of choices was significant (F(2,48) = 29.60, p < .001); the 
2-choice condition was the most accurate (M = 93.11%, SD = 8.4), followed by the 4-choice 
condition (M = 89.75%, SD = 11.81), and the 8-choice was least accurate (M = 74.62%, SD = 
19.60; Figure 12). While the 2- and 4-choice conditions were not significantly different from 
each other, both were significantly more accurate than the 8-choice condition (both p < .001). 
This suggests that when participants are required to make a specific response for each option, 
adding choices to task causes a decrease in the accuracy of the decision process. 
3.3.4 Definitive Response Version – Reaction Time 
Overall reaction times were well within the 8000ms of motion during the trial (M = 3074.68ms, 
SD = 568.52). A repeated-measures ANOVA found that the main effect of number of choices 
was significant (F(2,48) = 27.26, p < .001; Figure 13). The 2-choice (M = 2671.49, SD = 695.56) 
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and 4-choice (M = 2674.29, SD = 663.77) conditions were equal in speed, while the 8-choice 
condition was significantly slower (M = 3449.65, SD = 617.59; both post-hoc comparisons were 
p < .001). This suggests that the decision process is affected by the number of choices available, 
but perhaps not in a linear fashion as expected from the stimulus-response literature. 
3.3.5 Definitive Response version – Angular disparity of errors 
As more response alternatives are available, evidence is divided among finer grain distinctions. 
Therefore, we would expect that errors should be made through selection of a response 
alternative similar to the correct alternative, not a random other possibility. To assess this, errors 
in each block were sorted by the angle of disparity from the correct response alternative 
(regardless of clockwise or counterclockwise direction) and then entered into a one-way repeated 
measures ANOVA per block (Figure 14). The data was analyzed per block to avoid data loss due 
to high performance in the 2-choice condition, which would eliminate data points from other 
conditions if a 3x4 ANOVA was performed instead (i.e., participants with 100% correct 
performance in the 2-choice condition would be removed from all conditions). The numbers of 
retained participants per analysis are reported with the statistics below. 
There are two predictions of interest. First, if participants are performing the task 
correctly, errors should be isolated to 180  in disparity in the 2-choice block and 90  and 180  in 
the 4-choice block. Errors that are 45  in disparity from the correct response alternative are likely 
the result of motor error rather than selection error. Second, in the 8-choice block, in which all 
buttons are associated with a response, there should be a higher proportion of incorrect responses 
made with a 45  angle of disparity off the correct alternative than other angles of disparity. 
Importantly, errors of 45  in the 2- and 4-choice can be used to calculate a more accurate 
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depiction of selection error in the 8-choice condition by subtracting the 2- and 4-choice 45  error 
baseline rate from the 45  error rate in the 8-choice block. 
The one-way repeated-measures ANOVA (N = 16) with 4 levels of angular disparity 
(45 , 90 , 135 , and 180 ) for the 2-choice block resulted in a significant main effect (F(1.23, 
18.45) = 116.54, p < .001). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons illustrate that the majority of errors 
were made at 180  in disparity from the correct response alternative, with no difference among 
the rates for 45 , 90 , and 135  disparities (all comparisons p > .5). Only 2.5% of errors were 
made at 45  in disparity from the correct response, suggesting that motor error was low.  
The one-way repeated-measures ANOVA (N = 22) for the 4-choce block also resulted in 
a significant main effect (F(1.65,34.72) = 12.71, p < .001). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons 
highlighted a higher proportion in the 90  and 180  disparities versus the 45  and 135 disparities 
(p < .05), with no difference within the pairs. This result combined with the finding of high 
errors in the 180  disparity in the 2-choice block confirms that participants were responding 
according to the directions for available response alternatives per block. In addition, there again 
were a low proportion of errors at 45  in disparity (5.6%). 
The one-way repeated-measures ANOVA (N = 25) for the 8-choice block again resulted 
in a significant main effect (F(1.70,40.87) = 31.99, p < .001). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons 
highlighted no difference in the proportion of errors at 90 , 135 , and 180  in disparity (all p > 
.2), but significant differences between each of these angles and errors at 45  in disparity (all p < 
.001). These results remain significant in the same pattern even when the proportion of errors in 
the 45  condition in the 8-choice blocks were adjusted by subtracting the average proportion of 
errors at 45  in disparity in the 2- and 4-choice blocks on a subject-wise basis. In addition, the 
proportion of 45  errors appears to double in magnitude from the 2- to 4-choice blocks, so a 
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second adjustment was made to the 8-choice block by subtracting double the proportion of 45  
errors from the 4-choice block to mimic this increasing trend. Even with this liberal adjustment, 
the pattern remains the same (though the main effect did decrease to p = .04). The continued 
significance despite adjustments for baseline motor error confirms that errors in the 8-choice 
block were likely due to the decision process rather than an increase in motor errors. 
3.3.6 Strategy Assessment 
Participants responded an average confidence level at the initial button press of 53.75% (SD = 
24.85). While this is lower than expected (past object recognition experiments with a similar 
structure have reported confidence of approximately 85%; Ploran et al., 2007), this appears to be 
due to a handful of participants reporting confidence levels in the 10-30% range. Instructions 
emphasized maintaining a high level of confidence, so these low reported values suggest either a 
low level of motivation or a lack of understanding of either the instructions or question. 
Excerpts from the open-ended section of the questionnaire are included at the end of the 
chapter. A large proportion of the participants (11 out of 24) explicitly mentioned focusing on 
the fixation cross, which suggests the instructions to maintain fixation throughout the experiment 
were heeded appropriately. In addition, several subjects (6 out of 24) mentioned trying to relax 
their vision or not to focus too hard in order to see the whole circle of dots. In general, the 
answers to the open-ended question did not vary substantially, and several participants 
spontaneously mentioned strategies similar to those assessed in the close-ended questions 
discussed below. 
In the close-ended section of the questionnaire, participants rated a set of pictures 
depicting possible ways to divide the circle of dots, with marks to indicate areas of attention and 
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inattention (1.0 ). Of the three options participants rated for the 2-choice decision (Figure 15), the 
third option was the closest to their chosen strategy (M = 54.77%, SD = 39.95), followed by the 
second option (M = 35.91%, SD = 34.35), and then the first (M = 25.45%, SD = 35.15). A 
repeated-measures ANOVA found that the main effect of strategy choice was significant 
(F(2,42) = 4.02, p = .02); participants attended to a narrow band of the space while ignoring the 
outside in order to choose between the two options. For the 4-choice strategies, the two options 
were equal in similarity to the chosen strategy (Figure 15; M = 52.05%, SD = 39.48; M = 
50.23%, SD = 35.74, respectively) and a repeated-measures ANOVA found that the main effect 
was not significant. There seems to be some preference for dividing the space, but there was less 
agreement on whether attempts were made to ignore some parts of the space in order to simplify 
the problem. 
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Figure 12. Accuracy as a function of number of choices in the definitive response version. 
 
Figure 13. Reaction time as a function of choices in the definitive response version. 
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Figure 14. Angular disparity of errors from correct response alternative. 
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Figure 15. Subjective assessment of possible strategies to divide the screen as the number of 
alternatives increased. 
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3.4 DISCUSSION 
The comparison of the one-button versus the definitive response versions of the 
experiment presents a stark contrast. While overall performance still remains high when 
participants press a particular button associated with each possible response, it does not match 
the self-report of those in the one-button condition. In addition, accuracy decreases and reaction 
time increases in the definitive response condition as more options are added to the problem 
space, yet both measures remain the same in the one-button version. Importantly, the analysis on 
the disparity of error responses from the correct response suggest that faulty motor execution is 
not likely able to account for the total decrease in performance. This suggests that participants 
are misreporting accuracy in the one-button task across all conditions, despite strong instruction 
to the contrary. The stable reaction time data also suggests that participants were not being as 
careful with signaling when they were confident of the direction of motion as those in the 
definitive response condition. This weighs heavily in favor of either always designing tasks with 
more definitive response options when possible, or at least training participants until they are 
reporting accuracy correctly based on verbal response at button press or comparison to a 
definitive response group. This highlights similar concerns to the design of stimulus-response 
paradigms as examined in Hick (1952) and Hyman (1953). When participants were forced to 
respond under conditions that ensured their button press was made at the moment of decision (by 
requiring a fast release of one button and selection of another with low error rates; Hyman, 
1953), response timing demonstrated a different pattern than a less controlled version of the 
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experiment (Hick, 1952). Unfortunately, the requirements used by Hyman inherently negated the 
ability to observe changes in accuracy. 
However, despite these differences in performance between the two conditions of the 
current experiment, the results from the definitive response condition still describe how 
increasing the number of choice alternatives affects performance. As mentioned above, accuracy 
decreased and reaction time increased as more choices were added to the problem space. This 
mimics the pattern found in previous perceptual decision experiments (Churchland, Kiani, & 
Shadlen, 2008; Leite & Ratcliff, 2010). It is important to note, though, that despite the decreases 
in accuracy, performance in the 8-choice condition was still well above chance levels (12.5%). In 
addition, the 2- and 4-choice decisions did not differ from each other in reaction time, suggesting 
an initial accuracy cost prior to a time cost associated with increasing available options. Given 
the high performance in the 90  condition in the similarity experiment (2.0 ) and the 4-choice 
experiment here (in which the options are 90  separated from each other), it is possible that this 
initial drop in accuracy was due to the increasing number of choices and not the increasing 
similarity of those options. The large decrease in accuracy from 4-choice to 8-choice (compared 
to a smaller decrease from 2- to 4-choice) and the significant increase in reaction time may then 
reflect both the increasing number of choices and the increasing similarity of options (similar to 
the changes in accuracy and reaction time between the 90  and 45  conditions in the similarity 
experiment).  
It is interesting to see that performance in the 4-choice condition reported here was 
approximately the same as the 90  condition in the similarity experiment reported in 2.0 . 
However, performance in the 8-choice condition was far worse than the complementary 45  (2-
choice) decision in the similarity experiment. Conservatively, accuracy is 15% lower and 
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reaction times are 1400ms slower, on average. These changes over and above the possible 
changes due to increasing similarity may be attributable to the increasing number of response 
alternatives. Considering the structure of the two popular mathematical models of the decision 
process may aid in explaining how adding options can cause a change in reaction time. In a race 
model of decision making, adding more response options would require more counters (one for 
each option), which may require more intense monitoring of ongoing activity if there is not an 
automatic trigger when a counter reaches threshold. It also means that the incoming sensory 
information and extracted evidence will have to be divided among those counters in smaller 
increments. In a diffusion model of decision making (assuming the possibility of a 
multidimensional diffusion model rather than the standard binary instantiation), increasing the 
number of response alternatives increases the space in which activity can drift. This would likely 
lead to longer paths to a boundary. In either case, decisions are likely to take longer, even if 
accuracy remains high (i.e., the threshold of activity needed to make a decision remains similar 
across trials despite increasing options). 
It is when considering this change in accuracy that the assessment of strategy may 
become relevant. The popular choices in the 2- and 4-choice conditions both involved the 
participant attending to certain parts of the field and ignoring others (Figure 14); this deviates 
from previously reported decision strategies involving the elimination of unlikely responses in 
order to concentrate evidence towards more likely alternatives (Tversky & Sattath, 1979; Payne, 
Bettman, & Johnson, 1988). However, if the common strategy involved ignoring parts of the 
stimulus field, this may account for the unexpected decreases in accuracy as the number of 
options increased. As the space is divided into smaller and smaller areas according to the number 
of response alternatives, participants attend to motion towards each option in a narrower space. 
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This results in less information and evidence per alternative despite the consistent coherence 
level across blocks and presence of motion on any trial being displayed throughout the circle. 
While a few participants reported focusing on the whole circle as their main strategy, the 
majority either spontaneously reported a division strategy or rated the division strategies highly. 
Because participants were instructed to do their best to respond on every trial, it is possible that 
under circumstances of low evidence (due to both the coherence level and the division strategy), 
participants were forced to make decisions prior to reaching threshold. This would result in the 
decreasing accuracy as number of options (and therefore division of the evidence) increased, and 
may require a timeout mechanism (or some other parameter) to execute the best decision 
possible prior to passing threshold. This potential for a timeout function in decision making will 
be assessed in the next experiment. 
3.5 EXCERPTS FROM STRATEGY ASSESSMENT 
 I tried to see if the dots would make smaller patterns of lines or streams in a consistent 
direction. 
 Pick one dot and follow it across 
 General feeling of movement, where did I perceive I’d be moving compared to the dots 
 Divided the screen into sides or quarters (for the 2- and 4-choice, respectively) 
 I focused on the dots nearest to the cross to see if I could figure out the direction. 
 I just stared at the cross and looked at the dots in my periphery 
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4.0  TIMING OF EVIDENCE 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Previous studies of perceptual decisions appear to fall into two procedural categories: 
brief, isolated presentations of stimuli (e.g., Ratcliff, 2002; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001) or 
continuous presentations of stimuli until response (Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Roitman & Shadlen, 
2002). Importantly, past studies have used a predictable relationship between the start of a trial 
and the presentation of the stimulus with minimal variation within an experiment (c.f., Green, 
Smith, & von Gierke, 1983). This is also true of the experiments in 2.0 3.0  here. However, there 
are often instances in which we are aware a stimulus is coming but do not know the specific 
timing of its presentation. We are therefore waiting for information without the ability to prepare 
for response execution. This experiment will assess how the timing of information relative to the 
expectation of its arrival affects speed of response.   
In 3.0 we saw a decrease in accuracy in the 8-choice condition, despite an increase in 
reaction time that should have allowed for enough evidence to accrue. It is possible that due to 
the division of evidence among many bins, participants may have been unable to gather enough 
evidence for any particular alternative among the 8 options. In order to execute a response prior 
to the end of each trial, participants may have used a timeout function to end the search before 
the threshold was passed. This in turn would cause the decrease in accuracy in addition to the 
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increase in reaction time. Several models of memory describe the possibility of a timeout 
function that serves to truncate search in favor of selecting the most likely option when it is clear 
no new information is forthcoming (Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Anderson, 2007). It is possible 
that perceptual decisions behave similarly. When confronted with ambiguous evidence towards 
an eventual decision, a timeout function would ensure that a decision is made even though the 
incoming sensory information does not provide enough evidence to pass a pre-defined threshold 
for response. This could be true both for cases in which the available evidence is ambiguous (like 
the experiment in 3.0 ) or, as in the present experiment, the availability of evidence itself is 
uncertain due to shifts in the timing. 
Before testing how the timing of evidence affects perceptual decisions, it is useful to 
consider how the process might change. In diffusion models, decisions arise from the accrual of 
evidence in a drift parameter that eventually meets a threshold. Once activity meets the 
threshold, the decision is executed in favor of the response alternative that threshold represents 
(Figure 16a). Using this framework, a timeout function could operate under two different guises. 
First, the neural mechanism that processes the decision could designate a relatively constant 
amount of time allowed for a decision; if this time is reached prior to activity passing a decision 
threshold, the response matches the closest threshold the activity would pass if given more 
time/evidence (Figure 16b). This is similar to the truncation of a memory search when no 
memory trace appears to be available (Gillund & Shiffrin, 1983; Anderson, 2007). On the other 
hand, the threshold needed to execute a decision could decrease over time, similar to how the 
start point and drift rate can vary in traditional diffusion models (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). 
Although many decision models include thresholds, there is often more discussion about the shift 
in start point due to the need for simplicity and the inclusion of as few integrals into the 
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mathematical instantiation of the model as possible (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). However, 
constraining the model for the purposes of simplicity may also be constraining interpretation of 
the results. For instance, changes in the start point are typically thought to occur as an indication 
of bias (Ratcliff, 1985; Voss, Rothermund, & Voss, 2004), much like low levels of neural firing 
for a particular option that may be forthcoming (Schultz, 2000). While this is likely the case 
when only two alternatives are present and the participant can keep track of the general ongoing 
ratio, it is unclear whether this continues to be true when more response alternatives (in the 
present case, eight) are available. Instead of changing the start point, it is possible that certain 
tasks may require a change in threshold. Previous accounts of diffusion models have allowed for 
changes in threshold, but only under particular instructions such as the speed/accuracy trade-off 
paradigm (Fitts, 1966; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). A potential mechanism for the timeout 
function, however, could be that as the decision process extends in time, the threshold the 
accumulating evidence needs to pass decreases, thereby increasing the chances of passing the 
boundaries and making a response (Figure 16c). This would be similar to the changes in 
threshold needed to increase speed under speed-emphasized instructions versus the threshold for 
accuracy in the complementary instructions (Fitts, 1966; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008), but would 
occur without explicit instruction. 
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Figure 16. Examples of how diffusion models may include a timeout function. A fast 
decision (e.g., low ambiguity evidence) is represented in blue and a slow decision (e.g., high 
ambiguity evidence) is represented in red; (a) Traditional diffusion model without a 
timeout function in which evidence accrues in the drift parameter and the decision is 
executed upon reaching the upper and lower bound; (b) Model with a predesignated time 
(vertical dashed line) at which a decision will be made in favor of the closest bound if the 
threshold has not yet been passed; (c) Model with a decreasing threshold as time extends 
(note: sigmoidal shape is for illustration purposes only). 
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While both of these possibilities would result in lower accuracy due to insufficient 
perceptual evidence to pass the initially high decision threshold, there are slightly different 
predictions with regard to reaction time. For the timeout option, with a definitive pre-designated 
time at which a decision is made, we would expect a consistent mean reaction time across 
responses when evidence is not forthcoming. By this view, in the current line of investigation in 
which a motion signal can appear transiently at any point in a long time window, we would 
expect participants to consistently false alarm earlier in the trial for trials in which motion is 
presented very late. The time at which participants false alarm should be similar across the later 
conditions (e.g., when motion is presented 6 seconds or 8 seconds into the trial) if a pre-
designated time is being used. For the variable threshold option, in which the threshold 
continually lowers as time goes on, response times should be related to the meeting of increasing 
evidence and the decreasing threshold. Under the same assumptions as random walk models, 
responses should vary in time based on physiological noise in interpreting incoming information 
and extracting evidence (Ratcliff, 1978; Smith, 1986; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008), and may allow 
for longer waiting periods than a pre-designated timeout. This variation dependent on 
physiological noise would create a wider distribution of response times across conditions, 
without clustering around one specific time point late in the trial. The following experiment will 
test how the timing of incoming evidence is incorporated into the final decision, and will 
examine the resulting changes in accuracy and reaction time. Reaction times that tightly cluster 
together late in the trial with a large number of false alarms will support the timeout model, 
while spread out reaction times more associated with the timing of the stimulus presentation will 
support the variable threshold model. 
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4.2 METHODS 
4.2.1 Participants 
Sixty-one healthy young adults (ages 18-25 years) were recruited from the Introduction to 
Psychology participant pool at the University of Pittsburgh. Participants were tested in groups of 
10-22 in a computer lab, with each seated at their own computer. The experiment lasted one hour 
and participants received one credit towards their course requirement. Prior to beginning the 
experiment, all participants completed a consent form approved by the Internal Review Board at 
the University of Pittsburgh. 
4.2.2 Materials  
The experiment was conducted using EPrime software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, 
PA) on Dell computers. Responses were made via the regular keyboard attached to the computer. 
The display presented white dots on a black screen contained within a circle of space 
approximately 4” in diameter; a fixation cross was in the middle of the circle. The dots were 
replotted in a random direction at a rate of 60Hz. The experimenter could control both the 
direction and coherence (i.e., how many dots were moving together in the same direction) of the 
display.  
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4.2.3 Design 
A 2000ms section of 25% coherent motion was embedded within each 10000ms trial. This 
section of motion was implemented at 5 different windows at equal intervals. In order to allow 
for enough time to respond, only the first 4 windows will be examined (see explanation of 
analysis parameters in Results). No other manipulations were included. There were 42 trials of 
each condition, for 210 total trials combined across conditions. Trials were chosen randomly and 
were broken into seven blocks of 30 trials each (approximately 6 minutes in length). 
4.2.4 Procedure  
After completing the consent forms, participants were given verbal instructions regarding the 
basic task structure, response options, and length of the experiment. Next the participants read a 
series of instruction screens reiterating this information with more detail; at the end they were 
asked to alert the experimenter of any questions they may have. Then they started a practice 
session consisting of 5 trials; afterwards they were again prompted to ask any remaining 
questions they may have. When the participants felt comfortable they proceeded on to the 
experiment, which was divided as described above. After each block of trials participants were 
asked to rest their eyes; at the end of the experiment they were thanked for their time and asked 
to leave the computer lab. 
Each trial began with 2000ms of random motion and a red fixation cross. Participants 
were instructed that periods with the red fixation cross contained no motion and no responses 
should be made at that time. The fixation cross would then change to white for 10000ms, and 
participants were to make a motion discrimination response once per trial (Figure 17). The 
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motion was set to 0% coherence except the 2000ms window of 25% motion that moved 
dependent on timing condition. When the participant felt confident about the direction of motion, 
he/she would press the corresponding number on the number pad at the right side of the 
keyboard. For example, “2” was down and “6” was right. Motion could be in any of 8 directions 
(up, down, left, right, and the diagonals). When not making responses, participants keep their 
finger on the “5” key in the middle of the number pad.  
4.2.5 Data Scoring and Sorting 
Trials were sorted based on when the 2-second bin of motion occurred (either the 1
st
 2 seconds, 
the 2
nd
 2 seconds, and so on up to the 5
th
 2 seconds of the trial). Each trial was then scored based 
the response; there were five possible responses: correct (number pressed on number pad 
matched direction of motion), incorrect (number response did not match direction of motion), 
fixation (response occurred during the fixation period prior to the start of trial), double response 
(two responses were made during the trial), and no response. Fixation, double response, and no 
response trials were removed for further analyses. The remaining correct and incorrect trials 
were sorted based on when the responses was made during the trial. Responses prior to the 
presentation of motion were labeled as false alarms. Responses during the 2 seconds of motion 
presentation and the 2 seconds immediately succeeding the motion stimulus (a 4 second window) 
were labeled as hits or misses according to accuracy. Responses more than 4 seconds after the 
presentation of motion were also discarded as it is difficult to assess whether these are late hits or 
misses, or false alarms after having failed to detect the motion.  
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Figure 17. Representation of the task. Light grey boxes indicate 0% (random) motion, dark 
grey boxes indicate 25% motion in any of 8 directions. Fixation crosses are the same for all 
trials. 
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4.3 RESULTS 
4.3.1 Accuracy and Reaction Time 
Five participants were removed from the analysis due to missing data in one or more conditions; 
this indicates that they did not learn to wait for the coherent motion and instead always 
responded within the first few seconds of each trial. Three more participants were removed from 
the analysis because their average accuracy across conditions was not above chance (note: in this 
particular experiment chance is 12.5% because there are 8 possible options at all times). In order 
to ensure accurate measurements of accuracy and reaction time, participants were required to 
have at least 3 trials per bin of data in order to be included. Using this guideline, 23 participants 
with fewer than three trials per bin per accuracy status were removed from the analysis. The 
following analyses were completed on data from the remaining 30 participants. 
To equate the amount of time available for response across conditions, only the 2000ms 
of motion (grey boxes, Table 1) and the 2000ms immediately afterwards will be analyzed for 
each condition (the maximum time possible in the 4
th
 bin condition; see Data Scoring and 
Sorting). For example, when motion was presented in the 2
nd
 condition, there were 571 trials 
during which participants attempted to make a response. In addition, the following 2000ms 
window (white box immediately to the right of the grey box) included another 667 responses to 
the motion. This division of the data results in roughly equivalent numbers of trials, though the 
4
th
 bin condition has slightly fewer (right column, Table 1). The diminished trial count in the 4
th
 
bin is due to an increase in false alarms during the 6 seconds prior to presentation of coherent 
motion. These false alarms will be analyzed in an ANOVA and incorporated into receiver-
operating characteristic analyses at the end of this section. 
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Table 1. Total number of responses across participants in each time window depending on 
trial type. Numbers in dark grey boxes indicate responses during actual motion, numbers 
within the green boundaries indicate analyzed responses (summed up in the column of 
green boxes to the right. 
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Accuracy was calculated by dividing the number of hits by the total number of trials in 
which the participants responded during the 4-second window during and after motion 
presentation as specified above. Accuracy decreased as the wait time prior to coherent motion 
increased (F(3,63.31) = 22.29, p < .001). Motion within the first 2000ms (1
st
 bin) resulted in high 
accuracy; as motion moved later in the trial, accuracy started to decrease (Table 2). Post-hoc 
pairwise comparisons reveal that the 1
st
 bin is more accurate than the others (all p < .001), the 2
nd
 
bin is more accurate than the 3
rd
 and 4
th
 bins (both p < .01), but the 3
rd
 and 4
th
 bins have similarly 
low accuracy (p > .10). This suggests that the decision process was operating with a higher 
threshold earlier in the trial that demanded more information in order to execute a response, 
leading to more accurate responses. 
Reaction time was calculated from the start of coherent motion in each trial to equate 
time across the conditions. A repeated-measures ANOVA indicated that overall reaction time, 
regardless of accuracy, decreased as the timing of motion occurred later in the trial (F(3,68.06) = 
44.54, p < .001); all post-hoc pairwise comparisons were significant (p < .03). This main effect 
of timing of the motion on reaction time is consistent for both Correct (F(3,87) = 15.30, p < .001) 
and Incorrect (F(3,87) = 31.073, p < .001) trials, indicating that the change in reaction time is an 
effect of the decision process as a whole, and does not change depending on how well the 
participant is able to interpret the incoming information. There was also a main effect of 
accuracy on reaction time (F(1,29) = 41.642, p < .001), such that Incorrect trials are faster than 
Correct trials (Table 2). However, an interaction was present (F(3,87) = 11.461, p < .001) and 
post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that the difference in reaction time depending on 
accuracy was only present for the 3
rd
 and 4
th
 bins (both p < .01), suggesting that it is after waiting  
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Timing of Motion Accuracy Correct Reaction Time Incorrect Reaction Time 
1st bin 69.2% (3.2) 2611.60ms (65.15) 2580.32ms (145.93) 
2nd bin 54.5% (2.9) 2349.87ms (92.09) 2216.02ms (113.93) 
3rd bin 46.5% (3.1) 2272.18ms (67.09) 1573.57ms (90.71) 
4th bin 44.1% (2.7) 2059.20ms (64.42) 1299.15ms (75.20) 
 
 
 
Table 2. Accuracy rates and reaction times depending on timing of motion (numbers in 
parentheses are standard error). Note: chance in this experiment is 12.5%. 
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for long periods of time prior to coherent information is presented that the decision process 
begins to lose fidelity. Overall, the data indicate that as decisions extend in time, the process 
through which those decisions are made changes; these changes result in faster, but less accurate 
responses once information is presented. 
4.3.2 False Alarm Rates 
One indication of a timeout function would be increased false alarm rates as the wait time before 
motion presentation increases. The longer the wait, the more likely a false alarm will occur. An 
analysis of the 5
th
 condition in which motion did not occur until the last 2 seconds of the trial, 
thus requiring 8 seconds of waiting, demonstrated an increasing number of false alarms as wait 
time increased. Trials were separated in 2-second bins to complement the timing of motion in the 
other conditions, and then the false alarm rate was calculated by dividing the number of false 
alarms by the number of trials that had not yet received a response (i.e., opportunities to false 
alarm). A repeated-measures ANOVA demonstrated that there was a higher percentage of false 
alarms at later times in the trial (F(3,87) = 65.18, p < .001). All pairwise comparisons were 
significant; descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3. Again this suggests that the decision 
process loses fidelity as the process extends in time, allowing for more premature executions of 
the decision (i.e., false alarms) prior to the presentation of information. 
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Time in Trial Mean False Alarm Rate (SE) 
0-2 sec 5.50% (1.2) 
2-4 secs 14.60% (1.2) 
4-6 secs 22.00% (1.5) 
6-8 secs 31.80% (1.8) 
 
 
Table 3. False alarm rates calculated from the 5th condition in which motion is not 
presented until 8 seconds into the trial. 
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4.3.3 Receiver-Operating Characteristic Analysis 
Sensory discrimination tasks often use a receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) analysis to 
assess participants’ sensitivity (d-prime, or d’) and selectivity (criterion, or beta). Due to the 
nature of the task, there is not an obvious way to calculate d’. Unlike tasks in which each trial 
presents a single stimulus (e.g., motion present or absent) and requires a single response (e.g., 
“present” or “absent”), the extended trial structure means that on any given trial participants have 
varying durations in which they may false alarm at the beginning of the trial and only one chance 
to make a hit or miss later in the trial. In addition, an early false alarm on a trial removes the 
opportunity for a hit once motion is presented due to instructions to only respond once per trial. 
Therefore the participant must continuously correctly reject (i.e., withhold response) for several 
seconds in order to have the opportunity to make a hit or miss once motion is presented. This 
overlapping dependence of response options may create several confounds for the ROC analysis. 
In order to capture as much as possible with this analysis, three different d’ and beta calculations 
were made. 
The first analysis assessed false alarm and hit rates for each trial type and calculated d’ 
and beta accordingly. Because it was not possible to make a false alarm when motion was 
presented in the first 2 seconds, this analysis only includes trials when the motion was in the 2
nd
, 
3
rd
, or 4
th
 bin. This analysis found that both d’ (F(2,58) = 98.58, p < .001) and beta (F(2,58) = 
151.05, p < .001) decrease as time waiting for motion increases. All post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons were significant (all p < .001; Table 4). 
The second d’ analysis focused on time within the trial, collapsed across conditions. This 
analysis calculated the probability of hits from conditions with coherent motion in the 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 
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or 4
th
 bins. Hit rates were calculated for each time epoch from trials in which motion was 
presented in that epoch, with responses in both that epoch and the immediately succeeding epoch 
collapsed together to account for RT differences (e.g., if motion was presented in the first bin, 
responses in the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 bins were counted for the first epoch). In order to separate the 
opportunity to false alarm at any given point with the opportunity to make a hit later in the trial,  
the false alarm rate was calculated from the 5
th
 bin. This analysis found a main effect of time 
within the trial on d’ (F(1.82, 52.70) = 69.59, p < .001). D-prime decreased in each succeeding 
time epoch within the trial (Table 5), with all post-hoc pairwise comparisons resulting in 
significance (all p < .01). Beta values also decreased as a function of epoch (F(3,87) = 82.39, p < 
.001); all post-hoc pairwise comparisons were again significant (all p < .01; Table 5).  
The third analysis redefined hits as any response made during the 4-second analysis 
window during and after motion presentation for each condition in relation to the total number of 
trials at which point motion had already been presented. In this case, accuracy was disregarded 
and any response during the 4-second window was considered a “hit”. False alarm rates were 
calculated using responses prior to motion onset in the other conditions during the 2-second time 
window for the calculated condition (e.g., for the 1
st
 condition hits were responses in the 1
st
 and 
2
nd
 bins when motion was presented in the 1
st
 bin, false alarms were responses during the 1
st
 bin 
during the 2
nd
-5
th
 timing conditions at which point motion had not yet been presented) in relation 
to the total number of trials for which a response had not yet been made (Figure 18). This 
analysis yielded some interesting results. Although there was a main effect of timing of motion 
on d’ (F(1.39,40.46) = 9.92, p = .001), this was driven by lower d’ values in the 2nd condition 
than the 1
st
 and 3
rd
 conditions (both comparisons p < .05) while there was no difference between 
the 1
st
 and 3
rd
 conditions (p = 1.0). In addition, there was also a main effect of timing on beta 
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values (F(1.41,41.01) = 118.47, p < .001), with all post-hoc pairwise comparisons significant 
(Table 6). 
While the results from these ROC analyses suggest that both sensitivity and selectivity 
decrease as time spent on the decision increases, it is important to note the issues described 
earlier. In the first analysis, there is a greater opportunity to false alarm in the 4
th
 condition than 
the 2
nd
 condition. The participant must withhold response (i.e., correctly reject) for the equivalent 
of 3 trial windows (6 seconds) to reach the information in the 4
th
 bin, while they only need to 
withhold response for 1 trial window (2 seconds) prior to motion in the 2
nd
 bin. While on the one 
hand this describes exactly the issue at hand (i.e., whether or not waiting longer causes more 
false alarms), the analysis may be biasing the results by including more opportunity. There was 
an attempt to control for this in the second analysis by using only the associated bin of the 5
th
 
condition for the false alarm rate, while still maintaining the hit rate from the appropriate 1
st
, 2
nd
, 
3
rd
, or 4
th
 condition. The d’ and beta values using this technique again demonstrated decreases in 
both measures as the decision process extended in time, suggesting that participants are losing 
sensitivity and selectivity over time. 
The third analysis presents a potentially more complicated story. Again, there are 
constraints on the validity of this analysis due to different numbers of trials per calculation of hit 
rate and false alarm rate. However, there is some possibility that d’ was remaining stable while 
beta values decreased. This would complement the hypothesis that the threshold for response is 
decreasing over time (represented by beta), while overall approach to the task is remaining 
constant (represented by d’).  
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Timing of Motion d' (SE) beta (SE) 
2nd bin 1.65 (.16) 1.52 (.10) 
3rd bin .69 (.14) .78 (.10) 
4th bin -.17 (.11) -.01 (.08) 
 
 
Table 4. D-prime and beta values calculated per condition. 
 
 
 
 
Epoch in Trial d' (SE) Beta (SE) 
0-2 secs 2.40 (.17) 1.82 (.09) 
2-4 secs 1.24 (.12) 1.11 (.06) 
4-6 secs .71 (.12) .80 (.05) 
6-8 secs .35 (.10) .50 (.06) 
 
 
Table 5. D-prime and beta values calculated using hit rates from the appropriate timing 
condition and false alarm rate from the 5th condition. 
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Figure 18. Depiction of analysis windows for third d' and beta analysis using the 1
st
 
condition as an example. Green box indicates 4-second window for hits in the 1
st
 condition; 
these responses were divided by the total number of responses in the dashed green window. 
The red box indicates the responses that were considered false alarms for the 1
st
 bin, and 
were divided by the total number of trials in the red dashed window. 
 
Timing of Motion d' (SE) Beta (SE) 
2nd bin 1.85 (.11) 1.88 (.14) 
3rd bin 1.16 (.07) .67 (.07) 
4th bin 1.68 (.15) .13 (.05) 
 
Table 6. Average values for the third d’ analysis that disregarded accuracy. 
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4.3.4 Mean Reaction Times Across Response Types 
One of the potential instantiations of a timeout function is a pre-designated time at which a 
decision must be executed regardless of what evidence has been presented. This would result in a 
relatively stable mean response time among the later conditions coinciding with the same timing 
as highest percentage of false alarm rates as indicated above. Alternatively, a variable threshold 
without a definitive time associated with it would result is a larger distribution of responses, with 
each later condition resulting in a later mean reaction time. To assess reaction times among the 
conditions, the mean of each participant’s RT distribution for each motion condition was 
calculated regardless of response type (e.g., false alarm, hit, or miss) and the pattern of RTs was 
assessed across bins 1-5. A repeated-measures ANOVA found that the mean response time 
decreased as the wait before motion was presented increased (F(2.42,70.06) = 32.12, p < .001). 
This is not surprising because the informative portion of the trial moved later across conditions, 
thereby moving the response times for hits and misses. However, the post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons highlight a more complicated story. While the 1
st
 condition is faster than all others 
(all comparisons p < .001) and the 2
nd
 condition is faster than the 3
rd
, 4
th
, and 5
th
 conditions (all 
comparisons p < .05), the latter conditions are not significantly different from each other (Figure 
19). Importantly, the average reaction times in the 4
th
 and 5
th
 conditions were prior to the 
presentation of coherent motion in those conditions, highlighting that decisions were consistently 
made prior to the presence of coherent information. In addition, the similarity of the mean 
reaction times for both the 4
th
 and 5
th
 conditions suggests that participants were unwilling to wait 
longer than a certain amount of time (approximately 5500ms per trial in the current experiment).  
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Figure 19. Mean reaction time depending on timing of motion, regardless of accuracy or 
false alarm status. 
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4.4 DISCUSSION 
These results highlight some interesting aspects of how the timing of incoming sensory 
evidence in relation to the start of the decision-making period can affect the end response out of 
that decision. The significant decreases in both accuracy and reaction time as the timing of 
evidence came later in the trial suggest that the decision process changed as it extended in time. 
Two competing hypotheses might account for these results. One theory would require that the 
timeout occur at a consistent, pre-designated time in the decision process that would function to 
maximize efficiency when it appears no new evidence will be presented, similar to discussions of 
some memory models (Gillund & Shiffrin, 1983; Anderson, 2007). At the pre-designated time, 
selection would be made of whichever response alternative was the most likely solution based on 
evidence that had accrued to that point. The other theory suggests that the threshold used to 
execute the decision process lowers over time, making it easier to execute the decision on little 
evidence but not requiring a response at a particular time. This is similar to how the threshold 
changes under speed instructions compared to accuracy instructions (Fitts, 1966; Ratcliff & 
McKoon, 2008), but would occur without explicit instruction on the part of the experimenter. 
While both hypotheses would predict decreases in accuracy due to response execution prior to 
the initial high threshold is passed, the pre-designated timeout would predict a consistency in 
mean reaction times among the later conditions while the lowering threshold would predict a 
larger distribution of reaction times across conditions.  
Not surprisingly, there was a decrease in accuracy as the timing of motion was later in the 
trial. In addition, two ROC analyses demonstrated decreases in both d’ and beta values, although 
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a third analysis presented the possibility of stable d’ values while beta decreased. Overall, the 
decrease in beta values suggests a lowering criterion to allow more responses as the trial 
continues. However, as mentioned in the Results section, it is unclear whether these values have 
any meaning given the task structure. Each trial had multiple opportunities to correctly reject or 
false alarm prior to the opportunity to make a hit or miss. The participant had to be able to 
continuously correctly reject the random motion over the course of the trial (up to 8 seconds in 
the 5
th
 condition) in order to give a single response during the coherent motion section. This 
overlapping nature involved in each trial made calculating the necessary rates difficult to do in 
isolation. In addition, the theory behind d’ assumes a 50% possibility for a hit given a stimulus 
(e.g., “old” vs. “new” responses to a studied item, or “present” vs. “absent” to a visual stimulus). 
The task in this experiment has only a 12.5% possibility of a hit given a stimulus (i.e., the 
participant identifies not only that the stimulus is present, but also the particular direction out of 
eight possibilities). Although it is possible to calculate signal detection measures for cases with 
more than two response alternatives, in which each pair of alternatives receives its own d’ 
measure (Macmillan, 1991), it continues to be unclear whether or not the task structure itself 
negates the use of a signal detection calculation. 
The results also demonstrated that when participants did wait long enough to see the 
coherent motion, reaction times to motion later in the trial were shorter than to motion early in 
the trial when measured from motion onset. That is, responses to motion in the 4
th
 bin were faster 
on average than responses to motion in the 1
st
 bin. This suggests that participants were using a 
less stringent decision rule as the trial went on in order to maximize response efficiently later in 
the trial. As a result, and as described above, accuracy was lower later in the trial. Aside from 
faster reaction times once motion was presented, overall reaction times (collapsed across false 
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alarms, hits, and misses) illustrated an interesting pattern. While average reaction times for the 
1
st
 and 2
nd
 conditions were after the presentation of motion, average reaction times for the 3
rd
 
condition were in the middle of the motion block. This is not surprising given the increase in 
speed of responses just described. However, average reaction times for the 4
th
 and 5
th
 conditions 
were prior to the presentation of motion, meaning that on average participants were responding 
before they saw any meaningful evidence (i.e., the majority of their responses in these conditions 
were false alarms). The tendency to respond prior to motion onset is confirmed by the increase in 
false alarm rate as the random motion at the beginning of the trial extended in time. What is 
particularly interesting is that the trial did not end upon response; participants still had to wait the 
full 10 seconds. This has two implications of note. First, there was no incentive for participants 
to make early responses as it would not shorten participation time. And second, participants 
would see the motion presentation late in the trial during the 4
th
 and 5
th
 conditions, which could 
in theory cause participants to learn to wait longer. Yet despite seeing motion at the end of the 
trial, it is clear given the average reaction time results that participants did not learn to wait 
longer. 
All of these findings lend support to both the lowering threshold and pre-designated 
timeout hypotheses. However, the overall reaction time data may highlight the stronger theory. 
There was no difference in mean reaction time in the 3
rd
, 4
th
, and 5
th
 conditions. Although the 
mean reaction time was within the motion period for the 3
rd
 condition, it was before motion was 
presented in both the 4
th
 and 5
th
 conditions  (Figure 20). In addition, this mean reaction time is 
consistent with the high rate of false alarms during the 3
rd
 and 4
th
 epochs. A reanalysis of the data 
in 1 second epochs (half the epoch size as the original analysis) demonstrated that the highest 
rates of false alarms occurred between 5000 and 8000ms, concurrent with the 5600ms average 
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response time across conditions (Figure 21). A repeated-measures ANOVA indicated that there 
was a main effect of timing on the false alarm rate (F(3.39,98.57) = 25.33, p < .001); in addition, 
the linear trend was also significant, indicating that the false alarm rate rose at each successive 
step (F(1,29) = 109.45, p < .001).  
The overall reaction time results suggest that the decision process in this experiment 
maintains a pre-designated time by which a decision must be made, regardless of the presence or 
absence of informative evidence. The consistency of average reaction times in the 3
rd
, 4
th
, and 5
th
 
conditions, in addition to the fact that the average times in the 4
th
 and 5
th
 conditions is prior to the 
availability of evidence, suggests that there is some mechanism pressuring for the execution of a 
response after a certain about of time (in this case, approximately 5.5 seconds). It should be 
noted that it is unlikely that this result is due to time pressure from the impending end of the trial 
(Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988). The average response time is only a little more than half the 
total trial length. All trials were 10 s in length, regardless of condition or response, so there 
should not have been an inherent pressure to respond prior to, on average, 6 seconds as the 
average reaction time suggest. In some ways, the decrease in reaction time dependent on wait 
length is a bit surprising. Previous studies that used a variable wait prior to the presentation of 
the stimulus found very little shift in reaction time after an initial speed-up (Green, Smith, & von 
Gierke, 1983); however, the longest wait period in that study was slightly over 3 seconds. It is 
possible that the extension of the wait period to more than twice that length on some trials is 
triggering a mechanism not previously found. 
 This experiment examined how perceptual decisions behave when confronted with a 
dearth of evidence for a required decision. In the trials presented here, participants often began 
with a lack of information for an extended period of time, yet were required to make a response. 
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When the timing of incoming evidence is ambiguous, some mechanism must be in place to 
efficiently execute a response as soon as evidence in available. If there were insufficient 
evidence to pass threshold (even a lowered one), a timeout function as described here would 
serve as an efficient way to limit decision time. Although there may be instances in which long 
decision times do not result in adverse consequences, it is better for cognition to err on the side 
of limiting processing so as to execute responses in a fast amount of time and free up resources 
for other matters (Kiani, Hanks, & Shadlen, 2008). In the results shown here, this may be the 
case even when the inevitable end of the trial is far from the time at which this mechanism acts. 
The next experiment will examine how flexible the decision process is during the earlier portion 
of the trial, which should be unaffected by any regulatory mechanisms (as illustrated by the low 
level of false alarms here). 
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Figure 20. Mean reaction time in relation to the task structure. Yellow stars indicate the 
mean reaction time for each condition; note that stars for the 4th and 5th conditions are 
located prior to the grey box indicating the 25% coherent motion stimulus. 
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Figure 21. False alarm rate collapsed across conditions, divided into 1-second epochs. 
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5.0  FLUCTUATIONS OF EVIDENCE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
When faced with imperfect evidence, the perceptual decision process attempts to gather 
evidence over time to maximize the amount of useful information available towards the decision. 
However, as seen in the previous chapter, the parameters used to make that decision may change 
as this process is drawn out. When coherent motion was presented later in the trial decisions 
were faster and less accurate, suggesting a change in the threshold used to assess the data and 
execute the decision. On the other hand, coherent motion presented early in the trial was 
processed through a slower, more accurate decision process. This suggests that the timing of 
incoming information may have different effects on the decision process. This leaves open the 
possibility that other slight changes in the stimulus may influence the process, such as changes in 
the fidelity of incoming information as is examined here. 
Attempts have been made to alter the decision process through various means. Research 
is several areas of perception have tested the ability to influence decisions by electrical 
microstimulation of relevant brain areas. For example, microstimulation of the lateral 
intraparietal sulcus can change the speed of responses dependent on whether the stimulation is 
affecting neurons that are excited or inhibited by the stimulus (Hanks, Ditterich, & Shadlen, 
2006). Also, previous research has shown that presenting short, presumably imperceptible, bursts 
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of strongly coherent evidence during an otherwise difficult decision can influence the final 
decision in motion discrimination paradigms in macaques without the aid of microstimulation 
(Huk & Shadlen, 2005; Kiani, Hanks & Shadlen, 2008). Huk and Shadlen (2005) found that the 
bursts created changes in the increasing trajectory of neural firing that caused it to reach the 
common level earlier than without the burst. That is, while initially accumulating normally, the 
burst caused the accumulation rate to increase. However, the monkeys were required to maintain 
fixation until a cue, so it is unknown whether or not this would have resulted in faster reaction 
times (e.g., faster rise in activity to the common plateau level would have triggered a threshold 
and caused a detection response). In addition, Kiani, Hanks, & Shadlen (2008) found that the 
effectiveness of the burst depended on the efficacy of the stimulus it interrupted. If the burst was 
inserted into a stimulus that was already above threshold, it did not affect the result. On the other 
hand, inserting a burst into a low coherence stimulus resulted in a longer effect, and was able to 
cause that effect later in the trial (i.e., presenting the burst later in time was still effective). 
The current experiment assesses whether or not changes in the stimulus (e.g., embedded 
bursts of motion like Huk & Shadlen, 2005) can create changes in reaction time, like those found 
from direct microstimulation in Hanks, Ditterich, & Shadlen (2006). Without artificial 
stimulation of the neuronal pools involved in the decision, the current experiment relies on 
natural increases in firing due to the stimulus itself. If the increase in firing due to increased 
coherence of the stimulus is strong enough to pass the decision threshold, we should see similar 
changes in reaction time compared to the microstimulation experiment (i.e., faster when highly 
informative evidence is present than not). This will be examined by inserting bursts of strong 
evidence early in the trial, at a time when threshold levels still appear to be high based on 4.0 . 
The goal is for the burst to be short enough to not cause the immediate execution of the decision, 
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but rather to influence the overall process and alter reaction time compared to trials without a 
burst of strong evidence. If the burst is long enough to immediately execute the decision, we will 
be unable to see how intermediate pieces of evidence influence the overall decision process, 
particularly the comparison of evidence in favor of and against the correct decision, described 
presently. 
The influence of the highly informative, but shortly presented evidence should affect both 
decisions in accordance with the extra evidence and in the opposite direction as well. If early 
highly coherent information has the ability to influence a later decision we should see earlier 
responses in pro-burst blocks and later responses in anti-burst blocks compared to blocks with 
only regular non-burst trials, representing shifts in the speed of integration based on the highly 
coherent information. However, as long as the burst itself does not cause the termination of the 
decision, accuracy should remain approximately the same as the threshold for the decision 
should remain the same throughout the experiment. (If the burst does terminate the decision, 
anti-burst trials will not be accurate.) That is, the veracity of the early information should not 
affect the overall decision, just the speed with which it is made; this would be similar to a change 
in the drift rate in a diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978). Another possibility is that while pro-bursts 
blocks will demonstrate faster responses, anti-burst blocks will be no different than regular 
blocks. This would support the theory that subjects ignore information that is contradictory to 
their current hypothesis (Mynatt, Doherty, & Tweney, 1978). 
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5.2 METHODS 
5.2.1 Participants 
Fifty-six healthy young adults (ages 18-25 years) were recruited from the Introduction to 
Psychology participant pool at the University of Pittsburgh. Participants were tested in groups of 
10-22 in a computer lab, with each seated at their own computer. The experiment lasted one hour 
and participants received one credit towards their course requirement. Prior to beginning the 
experiment, all participants completed a consent form approved by the Internal Review Board at 
the University of Pittsburgh. 
5.2.2 Materials 
The experiment was conducted using EPrime software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, 
PA) on Dell computers. Responses were made via the keyboard attached to the computer. The 
display presented white dots on a black screen contained within a circle of space approximately 
4” in diameter; a fixation cross was in the middle of the circle. The dots were replotted in a 
random direction at a rate of 60 Hz. The experimenter could control both the direction and 
coherence (i.e., how many dots were moving together in the same direction) of the display.  
5.2.3 Design 
Three different trial types were used in this experiment; all had eight possible directions of 
motion (the four cardinal directions and the four diagonals, separated by 45 ). The basic 
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(“regular”) trial lasted 16 seconds and included eight 2000ms segments. Over the course of these 
segments, coherence of motion began at 5% and increased in 5% increments to 35% and 
direction of motion was always the same across segments. The final 2000ms segment was 85% 
coherent motion, during which participants verified their response (see Procedure). On some 
trials (“pro-burst”), the third segment (beginning 4000ms into the trial) was altered to include a 
50ms burst of 85% coherent motion. The burst occurred 200ms into the segment to reduce 
visibility of the manipulation, and was in the same direction as the rest of the segments. On other 
trials (“anti-burst”), the trial structure was the same as for “pro-burst” but the direction of motion 
in the burst was 180  in rotation in comparison to the rest of the trial. 
Trials were separated into four types of blocks. “Regular” blocks contained only 
“regular” trials to assess baseline performance on the task. “Pro” blocks contained a 25:75 mix of 
“pro-burst” and “regular” trials. “Anti” blocks contained a 25:75 mix of “anti-burst” and 
“regular” trials. “Mixed” blocks contained a 25:25:50 mix of “pro-burst”, “anti-burst”, and 
“regular” trials. The ratios were selected to limit how noticeable the burst manipulation was to 
participants, thus avoiding changes in strategy as much as possible. Participants completed 8 
blocks total, two for each type. The Regular, Pro, and Anti blocks had 20 trials each; the Mixed 
blocks had 24 trials each. 
5.2.4 Procedure 
After completing the consent forms, participants were given verbal instructions regarding the 
basic task structure, response options, and length of the experiment. Next the participants read a 
series of instruction screens reiterating this information with more detail; at the end they were 
asked to alert the experimenter of any questions they may have. Then they started a practice 
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session consisting of 13 trials; afterwards they were again prompted to ask any remaining 
questions they may have. When the participants felt comfortable they proceeded on to the 
experiment, which was divided as described above. After each block of trials participants were 
asked to rest their eyes; at the end of the experiment they were thanked for their time and asked 
to leave the computer lab. 
Each trial began with 2000ms of random motion and a red fixation cross. Participants 
were instructed that the red cross indicated random motion and they should not respond during 
these periods. The motion discrimination period started once the fixation cross turned to white; 
each trial lasted 16 seconds total, divided into eight 2000ms segments. During the first segment, 
motion was presented at 5% coherence. Over the course of the succeeding segments motion 
increased in coherence in 5% increments through 35% at the seventh segment. The eighth (and 
last) segment consisted of motion at 85% coherence (Figure 22, “Regular” row). Depending on 
the trial status, a 50ms burst of motion may have occurred in the third segment as previously 
described in the Design section (Figure 22, “Pro Burst” and “Anti Burst” rows). The direction of 
motion was the same throughout all eight segments, except for “anti-burst” trials in which the 
burst of motion was in the opposite direction as the rest of the trial. 
Participants were instructed to press the space bar when they could indicate the direction 
of motion. At the end of the trial during the 85% coherent 2000ms segment, participants were to 
press the space bar a second time if the direction of motion matched their earlier guess. If the 
direction did not match, participants withheld a response. 
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Figure 22. Illustration of task structure for the burst experiment. Fixation row, color of the 
fixation cross depending on break versus task periods; Regular row, coherence levels as 
they increased in 2000ms blocks, indicated by increasing saturation of grey; Pro Burst and 
Anti Burst rows, burst trials included an 85% coherence segment, indicated by the black 
bar, during the third portion of the trial (other 15% coherence). Note that verification 
responses were made during the final 2000ms of the trial during 85% coherent motion, 
illustrated to the right of the 14s marker. 
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5.3 RESULTS 
Data from two participants was removed due to data recording problems. Data from two 
more participants was removed due to 0% accuracy scores, indicating a lack of learning the task 
properly. All data from the remaining participants (N = 52) was included in the following 
analyses; Greenhouse-Geisser corrections for sphericity violations were used when appropriate.  
Overall accuracy was high but not perfect (M = 77.12%, SD = 14.52), indicating that 
participants were not inflating their self-reported accuracy as much as those in 3.0 . The self-
reported accuracy rate is similar to an object recognition experiment with the same response 
structure (Ploran, Tremel, Nelson, & Wheeler, submitted), suggesting that with proper 
instruction and oversight, this response method can elicit good estimations of performance.  
5.3.1 Changes in performance by block 
Descriptive statistics for accuracy and reaction time broken down by trial type and block are 
presented in Figure 23 and Figure 24. It was expected that changes in the stimulus should only 
affect reaction time and not accuracy; therefore it is important to assess accuracy across the 
different blocks prior to analyzing specific trial types. Accuracy was only marginally different 
dependent on block (F(2.55, 130.30) = 2.54, p = .069). Post-hoc comparisons indicate that this 
effect is driven by lower performance in the Pro Block (M = 74.63%, SD = 14.43) compared 
with the Mixed Block (M = 78.31%, SD = 14.47; p = .03) and the Regular Block (M = 78.60%, 
SD = 13.91; p = .04). There were no other significant pairwise comparisons. 
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Despite the only marginal differences in accuracy dependent on block, there were 
significant differences in reaction time (F(2.66,135.97) = 17.38, p < .001). The Anti (M = 
8005.64ms, SD = 1241.02) and Regular (M = 8151.16ms, SD = 1151.06) blocks, while not 
different from each other, are significantly slower than the Mixed (M = 7313.07ms, SD = 
1389.61) and Pro (M = 7492.58ms, SD = 1446.95) blocks. This suggests that there were at least 
some differences in the decision process, even if performance remains at the same high level.  
5.3.2 Comparison within blocks 
Within the Mixed block, there was a main effect of trial type on accuracy (F(2,102) = 6.6, p = 
.002). Anti trials were the least accurate (M = 73.98%, SD = 19.44), then Regular trials (M = 
79.35%, SD = 18.07), and Pro trials were the most accurate (M = 81.69%, SD = 13.97). While 
the difference between Regular and Pro trials was not significant (p = .86), both were 
significantly better than Anti trials (p = .06 and p = .002, respectively). In addition, a main effect 
of trial type was also found when examining reaction time (F(2,102) = 30.42, p < .001). All 
pairwise comparsions are significant (p < .05); Regular trials were the slowest (M= 7904.01ms, 
SD = 1311.42), then Anti trials (M = 7443.22ms, SD = 1705.59), and Pro trials were the fastest 
(M = 6587.19ms, SD = 1621.70). This indicates that the burst was affecting the timing of the 
decision (i.e., causing faster decisions for both Pro and Anti trials), but was also affecting the 
fidelity of the decision (i.e., lower accuracy for Anti trials). 
There were no differences in accuracy between Anti trials and Regular trials in the Anti 
block (t(51) = -1.06, p = .29). However, there was a difference in reaction time (t(51) = -2.82, p 
= .007) such that Anti trials (M = 7650.58ms, SD = 1697.25) were faster than Regular trials (M = 
8174.13ms, SD = 1136.36). A similar pattern of results was found for the Pro block. There was 
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no significant difference in accuracy between Pro and Regular trials (t(51) = .009, p = .99), but 
there was a significant difference in reaction time (t(51) = -5.80, p < .001). Pro trials (M = 
6611.56ms, SD = 2003.63) were faster than Regular trials (M = 7908.15ms, SD = 1360.48).  
5.3.3 Changes across blocks in performance by trial type 
A repeated-measures ANOVA failed to find a significant difference among accuracies for 
Regular trials across blocks (F(2.30,117.34) = 2.27, p = .10). There was also no significant 
difference in accuracy for Anti trials across blocks (t(51) = 0.41, p = .68). However, there was a 
significant difference in accuracy for Pro trials across blocks (t(51) = 2.94, p = .005); Pro trials in 
Pro blocks were less accurate (M = 74.52%, SD = 19.52) than Pro trials in Mixed blocks (M = 
81.69%, SD = 13.97). For reaction time, again there was no significance difference for Regular 
trials dependent on block (F(2.74,139.66) = 2.18, p = .10). Comparisons for Anti trials (t(51) = 
.896, p = .37) and Pro trials (t(51) = .12, p = .91) also lacked significant differences in reaction 
time dependent on block.  
For the next analyses, performance Regular and Anti trials were collapsed across blocks, 
respectively. Pro trials, due to the significant difference in accuracy depending on block, 
remained separated by block (Pro vs. Mixed). The comparison of accuracy depending on trial 
type revealed a significant difference (F(2.14,109.15) = 5.36, p = .005). Post-hoc comparisons 
found that Pro trials in Mixed blocks were more accurate than all other trial types (all p < .05; 
Table 7). The comparison of reaction time depending on trial type also revealed a significant 
difference (F(2.03,103.60) = 28.99, p < .001). Post-hoc comparisons found that both Pro trial 
types (in Pro blocks and Mixed blocks; p =1.00) were faster than Anti trials, which in turn were 
faster than Regular trials (all p < .01; Table 7). 
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Figure 23. Accuracy by trial type and block type. 
 
 
Figure 24. Reaction time by trial type and block type. 
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Table 7. Average accuracy and reaction times for Anti trials collapsed across blocks, 
Regular trials collapsed across blocks, and the two Pro trial types separated by block. 
 All Anti Trials All Regular Trials 
Pro Trials,  
Mixed Block 
Pro Trials,  
Pro Block 
Accuracy (SE) 74.6% (2.5) 77.7% (1.7) 81.7% (1.9) 74.5% (2.7) 
Reaction Time 
(SE) 
7546.90 (205.62) 8034.36 (148.92) 6587.19 (229.05) 6611.56 (277.75) 
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5.3.4 Changes reaction time by accuracy and trial type 
For each of the following analyses, trials for which there was an invalid response (e.g., no 
response, response during fixation) were discarded. The remaining trials were sorted within each 
block by trial type and accuracy and entered into an ANOVA (or t-test in the case of the Regular 
block) to test effects of accuracy on reaction time dependent on trial type (Figure 25). Post-hoc 
pairwise comparisons were made when appropriate. 
5.3.4.1 Regular Block 
A paired samples t-test comparing reaction times for correct versus incorrect trials was 
significant (t(50) = 2.40, p =.02). When no bursts were present at any time during the block, 
incorrect trials were faster than correct trials. This suggests that the errors may arise through a 
faulty decision process that triggers the decision before enough evidence is gathered. 
5.3.4.2 Anti Block 
A 2x2 repeated-measures ANOVA tested the effects of accuracy and trial type (anti-burst 
versus regular) on reaction time. While there was no difference in reaction time dependent on 
trial type (F(1,40) = 1.22, p = .28), there was a main effect of accuracy (F(1,40) = 8.18, p < .01). 
There was not a significant interaction (F(1,40) = .10, p = .75), demonstrating that incorrect trials 
were faster than correct trials without a dependence on trial type. This matches the results of 
regular block. 
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5.3.4.3 Mixed Block 
 A 2x3 repeated-measures ANOVA tested the effects of accuracy and trial type (anti-
burst, regular, and pro-burst) on reaction time. As previously reported, the main effect of trial 
type was significant (F(2,74) = 11.33, p < .01) and post-hoc pairwise comparisons demonstrate 
that pro-burst trials were faster than both regular and anti-burst trials, but there was no difference 
between anti-burst and regular trials. In addition, there was a main effect of accuracy on reaction 
time (F(1,37) = 9.67, p < .01), such that incorrect trials were faster than correct trials. There was 
not a significant interaction (F(2,74) = .265, p = .77), illustrating that changes in reaction time 
dependence on performance were independent of changes in reaction time due to burst status. 
5.3.4.4 Pro Block 
A 2x2 repeated-measures ANOVA tested the effects of accuracy and trial type (pro-burst 
and regular) on reaction time. As previously reported, the main effect of trial type was significant 
(F(1,45) = 15.05, p < .001), with pro-burst trials resulting in faster times than regular trials. In 
addition, the main effect of accuracy was also significant (F(1,45) = 21.99, p < .001), continuing 
to demonstrate faster reaction times for incorrect trials than correct trials. Again, there was no 
interaction between the two factors (F(1,45) = .58, p = .45). 
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Figure 25. Reaction time by accuracy per trial type in each block. 
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5.4 DISCUSSION 
Overall accuracy was the same regardless of trial type or block status aside from the Pro 
trials in the Mixed block that demonstrated an aberrant increase in performance. This suggests 
that the participants maintained the same decision threshold throughout the experiment 
regardless of trial type or the mix of trials per block. However, despite the similar threshold 
leading to similar accuracy, there were several differences in reaction time depending on both 
trial type and block status. Although reaction times were consistently faster for incorrect trials 
than correct trials, an interaction between this effect and trial status was not found, indicating 
that effects to the decision process did not differentially affect accuracy depending on the 
presence or absence of a burst. Taken together, the change in reaction time despite the consistent 
performance level indicates that the journey through the decision process was altered depending 
on the trial, not the ultimate threshold executing a decision. This agrees with the fluctuations in 
drift rate but steady threshold used in diffusion models (Ratcliff, 1978).  
For example, in Mixed blocks that included Regular trials as well as trials with bursts 
both in the same direction of motion (Pro) and against the direction of motion (Anti), reaction 
time changed according to the validity of evidence in the trial. Pro trials, with a burst of highly 
coherent motion in the same direction as the rest of the trial, resulted in faster decisions than 
Regular trials. In contrast, Anti trials presented evidence against the rest of the trial and resulted 
in slower decisions than Regular trials. These results uphold the hypothesis that bursts of motion 
(i.e., momentary increases in the fidelity of the stimulus) would influence the speed of the 
perceptual decision without affecting the accuracy. Although the data has not been modeled, it is 
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useful to consider what changes to the three basic diffusion model parameters (start point, drift 
rate, and threshold) would create this pattern of data. It is unlikely that the start point was 
shifting, as the direction of motion could be in one of eight directions on any given trial. Shifting 
the start point would make it harder to reach threshold on most trials (i.e., 7/8 of trials on 
average) regardless of burst status. It is also unlikely that the threshold changed between trials, as 
the accuracy remained that same regardless of burst status. This suggests that participants 
required the same amount of evidence for each decision, whether or not there was a burst adding 
to that overall information. This leaves open the possibility of changes to the drift rate. Strong 
Pro evidence would increase the rate; strong Anti evidence would decrease the rate. This altered 
rate would then take less or more time to reach the common threshold causing the reaction time 
patterns seen here, and would also mimic the neural firing patterns previously reported (Huk & 
Shadlen, 2005). It also refutes the notion that participants ignore evidence counter to their 
inclination (Mynatt, Doherty, & Tweney, 1978), in which case we would have expected reaction 
times for Anti trials to be similar to Regular trials. 
Although the results in the Mixed block appear to fully support the hypothesis about how 
highly coherent bits of information influence the overall decision process, there were also results 
that did not necessarily agree with this suggestion. During the Anti block, Anti trials were 
expected to be slower than Regular trials due to the influence the burst should have on the drift 
rate; however, the results indicate that Anti trials were actually faster than Regular trials. Despite 
the best efforts to make the burst of coherent motion consciously imperceptible to participants, it  
is possible that there were some who noticed the change in trial structure. For those who were 
able to both recognize the existence of the burst and identify the direction of motion during the 
burst (50ms in duration), it is possible they adopted different strategies depending on the mix of 
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trials included in the block. For blocks in which the burst always agreed with the final decision 
(e.g., the Pro block), participants could rely on the burst and make a quick answer. For blocks in 
which the burst always disagreed with the final decision (e.g., the Anti block), participants could 
again rely on the burst to indicate the answer – only in the opposite direction of the burst motion. 
However, in Mixed blocks the burst does not reliably indicate the direction of motion, so 
participants can only partially rely on the burst evidence. Because the participants were naïve to 
which trials would be included in any particular block, this change in strategy would have to 
develop of the course of a the first few trials in each block. Therefore it will be important to test 
the trial-by-trial fluctuations in performance to see if there are markers for strategy change. This 
will be addressed in the next chapter, which examines how strategy may develop over the 
beginning of each block and how the status of a previous trial (e.g., burst present or absent, 
performance, speed of decision) may influence performance on the next trial. 
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6.0  ONGOING ADJUSTMENTS TO THE DECISION PROCESS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous four chapters have discussed results from experiments that are averaged 
over whole blocks or experiments. In fact, with notable exceptions in which single trials of 
neural firing are assessed and responses are predicted after a model has been built (Kiani, Hanks, 
& Shadlen, 2008) or single trial simulated data using a model based on averaged real data 
(Mazurek, Roitman, Ditterich, & Shadlen, 2003), research on perceptual decisions appears to 
always average over blocks of trials. This assumes that the decision process in any given 
experiment is static from beginning to end. In addition, the model created by Mazurek and 
colleagues (2003) used a stationary threshold based on the best fit to the averaged behavioral 
data. This approach, while useful for the model, likely fails to capture some of the ongoing 
fluctuations present in the process; in fact, the previous chapter on the burst experiment found 
differences in performance depending on the mix of trials in a block, indicating some potential 
shifts in strategy throughout the experiment. This is not surprising given the shifts in strategy and 
use of heuristics previously found during multiple attribute decisions (Payne, Bettmann, & 
Johnson, 1988). When confronted with changing task demands and uncertain stimuli, it is likely 
more efficient to adopt a variable strategy depending on growing knowledge of the overall task 
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structure through recent trial history. In addition, effort and motivation, as affected by previous 
trial history, may also affect each new decision (Thomas, 1983). 
As discussed in 2.0 , the perceptual stimulus used here does not afford a large amount of 
variability. While multiple attribute decisions may require strategy adoption for efficient and 
efficacious selection of a response alternative, it is not clear that this is true for simple perceptual 
decisions as studied here. However, given the number of parameters often used to model the 
decision process (e.g., start point, drift rate, threshold; Ratcliff, 1978), it seems naïve to assume 
these parameters remain static. Indeed, some early models involved presampling of the problem 
space in such a way that there were trial-to-trial correlations of response time (Laming, 1979). 
Yet it is important to remember that parameters in a mathematical model are designed to account 
for the data, and that does not necessarily mean those parameters are present in the neuronal 
pools underlying the responses. In fact, as mentioned in the introduction, studies of temporal and 
spatial attention (potentially more similar to the tasks used in the current set of studies than the 
multiple attribute studies of real estate, etc.) have not shown trial-by-trial variability in responses 
(Vul, Hanus, & Kanwisher, 2009), nor have some studies of choice reaction time for auditory 
stimuli (Green, Smith, & von Gierke, 1983).  
The previous literature sets up an interesting contrast between instances of strategy 
adoption and studies without across-trial variability. Due to the experimental designs here, 
participants were usually aware of the manipulation and experienced more than one condition in 
each block (with the exception of the increasing choices experiment in 3.0 ). To assess how these 
theories may apply to perceptual decisions, this chapter will assess potential trial-by-trial 
fluctuations in performance depending on previous trial status (e.g., burst or non-burst, difficulty 
of pairing) and previous trial performance (e.g., correct vs. incorrect).  
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6.2 ADJUSTMENTS BASED ON MANIPULATIONS 
As mentioned above, three out of the four main experiments presented here included 
mixes of trial types within each block (easy vs. difficult pairs of alternatives in 2.0 , early vs. 
later presentations of motion information in 4.0 , and pro- or anti-informative bursts in 5.0 ). 
Although the participants are not explicitly told the composition of each block, through 
experience they could develop a sense of the structure (with potentially the exception of the burst 
experiment which was designed to avoid detection by the majority of participants). If the 
participants understood the mixture of trials in each block, they may have used this knowledge to 
adjust their strategy on a trial-by-trial basis. In a sense, participants may have gambled on what 
the next trial would be, and thereby adjust their threshold for response higher (for predicted 
difficult trials) or lower (for predicted easy trials). Changes of the threshold in this way would 
result in changes in reaction time. The following section includes analyses of reaction time for 
the similarity, timing of evidence, and burst experiments based on the status of the previous trial 
based on the appropriate manipulation. If participants were adjusting their threshold throughout 
the experiment, we would expect to see shifts in reaction time as a result. 
6.2.1 Similarity Experiment 
One interesting aspect of the experiment in 2.0  is that participants experienced a mix of easier 
(e.g., 67.5  and 90  comparisons) and more difficult (e.g., 45  and 22.5 ) comparisons. This 
embedded nature of the manipulation may cause some of the trial-by-trial changes in strategies 
based on effort (Thomas, 1983). After participants spend time on a difficult decision, they may 
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be more patient with the decision process in the following decision. Conversely, an easy decision 
may lead to more brash responses due to overconfidence.  
To assess this, trials were organized based on current difficulty and the difficulty of the 
previous trial, resulting in 16 categories (4 levels of difficulty for both current and previous trial 
status). The mean reaction time was then calculated for each participant in each of the 16 
categories. These were then analyzed in a repeated-measures ANOVA using Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrections when appropriate. As described in 2.0 , the main effect of current trial status was 
significant (F(2.17,78.24) = 28.23, p < .001), confirming that reaction time did change dependent 
on trial difficulty. Difficult trials (22.5  in difference between the two response options) had 
longer reaction times than easier trials (90  in difference between options). However, the main 
effect of previous trial difficulty was not significant (F(2.32,83.68) = 2.36, p = .09), suggesting 
that the difficulty of the immediately preceding trial did not affect the length of the decision 
process on the current trial. In addition, the interaction between current trial and previous trial 
difficulty was also not significant (F(6.47,232.81) = .74, p = .63). This suggests that participants 
did not adjust their strategy towards the current trial based on the previous trial differently for 
harder or easier current trials. For example, even when faced with a difficult trial, participants 
did not alter their decision process based on previous trial status. 
6.2.2 Timing of Evidence Experiment 
The manipulation in 4.0 was also embedded. Participants responded to a mix of trials in which 
the motion was presented at different times such that they may see motion in the first 2000ms 
(the 1
st
 bin) on trial 1, but in the last 2000ms (5
th
 bin) of trial 2. As was suggested in 4.0 , 
participants did not learn to wait longer in order to respond during the motion on trials with 
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motion in the 4
th
 and 5
th
 bins. However, this failure to learn is surprising considering they were 
forced to watch each whole trial, regardless of when they responded. Over the course of the 
experiment they would have seen many instances (1/5 of the total number of trials) in which 
motion was not presented until the last 2000ms of the trial. While not reflected in the average 
reaction time, it is possible that after watching a 5
th
 bin trial, participants would be more patient 
on the following trial (i.e., have a longer reaction time). 
To assess changes in strategy, each trial was coded with its timing of motion and the 
status of motion in the previous trial (e.g., motion in the 1
st
 bin, 2
nd
 bin, etc.). This created a 5 
(current status) x 5 (previous status) table for each participant with the mean reaction time 
calculated for each cell. These values were entered into a repeated-measures ANOVA to test for 
changes in strategy depending on the previous trial status. If participants demonstrate some 
change in strategy depending on the ongoing manipulations, we would expect trials presented 
after one in which motion was late (e.g., the 4
th
 and 5
th
 conditions) would have longer reaction 
times than trials presented after one in which motion was early. Unfortunately, this does not 
appear to be the case. While average reaction time for the current trial was significant as 
demonstrated in 4.0  (F(2.82,81.83) = 27.79, p < .001), reaction did not change dependent on 
previous trial status (F(3.22,93.31) = .414, p = .79). Although we may expect changes in reaction 
time only after certain types of trials (e.g., the 4
th
 and 5
th
 conditions as specified above), the 
interaction term was also not significant (F(8.78,254.54) = 1.13, p = .32), rejecting this 
hypothesis as well. Participants were not shifting their decision process to allow for more data 
processing even after watching examples in which motion was presented late and in the absence 
of a benefit for early responding. This continues to suggest that participants may cease to allocate 
 129 
resources to an ongoing decision to use those resources elsewhere (Kiani, Hanks, & Shadlen, 
2008), even when there is knowledge that more information is forthcoming. 
6.2.3 Burst Experiment 
Similar to the two previous manipulations, the burst manipulation was also presented in a mix of 
trials. The specific mixture of trials depended on block; Pro blocks had Pro and Regular trials, 
Anti blocks had Anti and Regular trials, and Mixed blocks had all three trial types. 5.0  describes 
how participants appeared to be most affected by the burst manipulation during the Mixed block, 
resulting in changes in accuracy and reaction time depending on trial type (both p < .01). This is 
not surprising, as the Mixed block included all three trial types, thus making the burst unreliable 
as a source of information either for or against the decision. To assess whether or not the status 
of the previous trial had an effect on performance on the current trial, data from the Mixed block 
were divided according to current and previous trial status (3 x 3 table). Due to this increased 
division of the data, some participants had to be excluded for low trial counts in particular 
category based on the combination of random sampling of the trials and invalid responses (e.g., 
responses during fixation, double responses, no response). The following analyses were 
conducted on a subset of participants who had sufficient trials (>3) in each cell (N = 38).  
If participants are changing their strategy during the Mixed block depending on which 
trials they have seen we would expect to see increases in speed after Pro trials and decreases in 
speed after Anti trials. These changes would reflect shifts in confidence relating to performance 
and the fidelity of the burst towards the correct solution. However, a repeated-measures ANOVA 
failed to demonstrate the main effect of previous trial type (F(1.88,69.76) = .504, p = .61; 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). In addition, the interaction with current trial status was also not 
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significant (F(3.39,125.38) = .713, p =.584). This suggests that although accuracy and reaction 
time changed dependent on current trial status, it was not due to the status of the previous trial. 
Participants were not relying on the presence and fidelity of the burst during the previous trial to 
adjust their strategy towards the current trial. 
6.3 ADJUSTMENTS BASED ON PREVIOUS TRIAL ACCURACY 
Although status of the previous trial did not affect any of the three experiments analyzed 
above, this does not preclude adjustments to threshold on the part of the participant. Thomas 
(1983) suggested that effort and motivation play a role in the adoption of a strategy. As seen in 
5.0 , the Mixed blocks that included Pro, Anti, and Regular trials led to the most changes in 
reaction time, possibly indicating true changes drift rate. In addition, Anti trials caused 
significantly lower accuracy than Regular or Pro trials, indicating that the burst was effective in 
disrupting the decision process. Due to the nature of the response structure for the burst 
experiment, participants saw a highly coherent motion stimulus at the end of the trial and were 
required to respond if it matched their guess earlier in the trial. This end of trial verification 
could act as feedback to the participants; it forced them to identify their accuracy, which could in 
turn lead to changes in strategy on the next trial due to motivation to perform well. The following 
analysis assesses whether or not reaction time changes based on the accuracy of the previous 
trial. 
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6.3.1 Burst Experiment 
As participants moved through the experiment, they verified each response at the end of the trial. 
This consideration of performance may have led to changes in threshold to maximize 
performance on the following trial. If the previous trial was correct, participants may have 
experienced a boost in confidence in their motion discrimination skills. This, in turn, could have 
led to a lowering of threshold for faster responses. On the other hand, incorrect performance 
would have lowered confidence and led to raising of the threshold to increase accuracy on the 
succeeding trial. 
To assess this, each trial was labeled with the accuracy of the previous trial. After this 
labeling, trials that had invalid responses (at fixation, double responses, and no response) were 
removed from the data due to a lack of a valid response time. Data was also separated based on 
block type (Anti, Mixed, Pro, Regular), as the results in 5.0 suggest there were differences in 
performance dependent on block. The average reaction time data was then calculated for each 
participant based on block and previous trial performance (4 x 2 design). Nineteen participants 
had to be excluded due to a high number of invalid responses that caused insufficient trials in 
one or more cells. Data from the remaining 33 participants was entered into a repeated-measures 
ANOVA. The main effect of block on reaction time was again significant (F(3,96) = 5.92, p = 
.001). However, the main effect of previous trial accuracy on reaction time was not significant 
(F(1,32) = .21, p = .65). Interestingly, though, the interaction between block and previous trial 
accuracy was significant (F(3,96) = 3.53, p = .02). Post-hoc t-tests indicated marginal, though 
opposite, effects in the Anti (t(32) = 1.81, p = .08) and Mixed (t(32) = -1.75, p = .09) blocks. 
There was no effect for the Pro (p = .13) and Regular (p = .85) blocks. In the Anti blocks 
reaction time decreased after correct trials compared to incorrect trials. Conversely, in the Mixed 
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blocks reaction time increased after correct trials compared to incorrect trials (Figure 26). These 
results suggest that there are subtle changes in threshold when participants are forced to verify 
their accuracy. This verification stage is likely acting as feedback, causing adjustments to 
performance under the general motivation to perform well. However, the reverse effects between 
the Anti and Mixed blocks indicate a more intricate story potentially based on previous trial 
status (e.g., Anti or Regular trial in Anti blocks; Anti, Pro, or Regular trial in Mixed blocks). 
Unfortunately, further dividing the data by previous trial type to tease apart these contrary effects 
results in too few participants that survive the minimum trial count to get reliable results. 
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Figure 26. Average reaction time based on previous trial accuracy and block status. 
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6.4 DISCUSSION 
This chapter contains two new analyses of the data from the various motion 
discrimination experiments described throughout this document. First, data from the similarity, 
timing of evidence, and burst experiments were reanalyzed to check for changes in reaction time 
based on the manipulation status of the previous trial (e.g., whether or not a burst was present). 
Previous research has suggested that participants may change their decision process depending 
on task structure, effort, and motivation (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988; Thomas, 1983). 
Each of the manipulations in these experiments may cause changes in effort (e.g., very similar 
vs. far apart options in the similarity experiment or early presentation of motion vs. late 
presentation of motion in the timing of evidence experiment). In addition, the burst manipulation 
may cause changes in motivation if participants noticed the manipulation (which may have 
caused some of the reaction time results as discussed in 5.0 ). However, the results from the 
analysis conducted here do not demonstrate the changes in reaction time that would be expected 
due to shifts in threshold based on strategy adoption. Instead, the results agree with those of Vul, 
Hanus, & Kanwisher (2009) and Green, Smith, & von Gierke (1983) which also failed to show 
trial-to-trial variability. 
The second analysis in this chapter assessed whether or not feedback from the preceding 
trial regarding accuracy would cause shifts in threshold, and thus reaction time, on the next trial. 
In theory, correct performance would cause increases in confidence and associated decreases in 
threshold. Conversely, incorrect performance would cause decreases in confidence and increases 
in threshold. A strategy along these lines would optimize performance for both speed (in high 
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confidence cases) and accuracy (in low confidence cases). Although there were no changes in 
reaction time based on previous trial accuracy with the Pro and Regular blocks, there were 
marginal effects in the Anti and Mixed blocks. Further inspection of these effects found an 
interesting contrast: the predicted effect (faster responses after correct trials, slower responses 
after incorrect trials) did occur in Anti blocks, but the opposite occurred in Mixed blocks. These 
results suggest that there was some trial-to-trial variability in the decision process, potentially in 
the threshold of activity necessary to execute a decision. Due to the paradoxical nature of the 
results, more experimentation is necessary to tease apart the underlying effects. It would be 
particularly interesting to conduct the burst experiment with only the Mixed block composition 
in order to have enough trials to test if and how previous trial status and accuracy may be 
interacting with one another. 
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7.0  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This dissertation sought to explore the perceptual decision process using a systematic 
approach in an effort to bridge and extend previous behavioral, neurophysiological, and 
neuroimaging work. By isolating manipulations but maintaining the same stimulus and general 
task structure, the results of each individual experiment can be discussed as a whole, an approach 
that has been lacking in the prior behavioral literature. In addition, this dissertation gives a broad 
account of how perceptual decisions are affected by minor changes in the decision environment. 
Building upon previous approaches using the random dot motion task, new manipulations of the 
similarity between response alternatives, number of response alternatives, timing of incoming 
evidence, and fidelity of that evidence add to the knowledge about how perceptual decisions 
behave. Importantly, these manipulations take steps towards a better understanding of perceptual 
decisions under more naturalistic conditions. Finally, consideration of results from prior work in 
both the perceptual decision and multiple attribute decision research was intended to push 
towards defining how the perceptual decision process emulates the general decision process used 
for more complicated situations like multiple attribute decisions. In sum, these four experiments 
and the trial-by-trial analysis determined that while perceptual decisions do often behave like 
multiple attribute decisions, this is not always the case, and more appreciation of the differences 
between these two processes is necessary. 
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7.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The first experiment (2.0 ) involved a perceptual decision between two specified 
directions of motion. The manipulation of interest was how similar the options were on each 
trial: 22.5 , 45 , 67.5 , or 90  apart. Although the main purpose of this experiment was to 
confirm that the 45  angle of disparity between options in the remaining three experiments was 
not going to retard performance in addition to the specific manipulations used in each, it also 
highlighted how similarity between options may affect performance. As the angle of disparity 
between options lessened from 45  to 22.5 , accuracy decreased and reaction time increased. 
This is likely due to the activation of neurons in motion-selective area MT (medial temporal 
lobe, or the human homologue in this case) that are sensitive to both directions of motion 
(Britten & Newsome, 1998; Butts & Goldman, 2006). A previous behavioral example of this 
type of interference was the effects on accuracy when comparing similar (e.g., E vs. F) vs. 
dissimilar (e.g., E vs. C) letter pairs (Ratcliff & Rouder, 2000). The first pair consist of almost 
identical lines with the exception of the bottom horizontal line for “F” compared to “E”; on the 
other hand, with only minor overlap in the upper and lower horizontal zones and the left vertical 
zone, “E” and “C” do not share as many features. This would alter how many neurons are 
sensitive to both letters in the pair. If the decision process in the brain makes a comparison 
between pools of neurons sensitive to the two choices and selects the more active pool, the 
activity levels in the “E” and “F” comparison will be closer than those in the “E” and “C” 
comparison, thus making it harder to identify the highest level of activity. In terms of motion 
selection, the superior colliculus has been identified as a potential monitor of the lateral 
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intraparietal area (LIP) and MT (Lo & Wang, 2006) and might be involved in the comparison 
required in the current experiment. 
The second experiment (3.0 ) explored how the addition of alternatives would affect the 
decision process. Initial work into perceptual detection (e.g., stimulus-response paradigms) found 
that as the number of potential stimuli increases, so does response time (Hyman, 1953). Limited 
work on perceptual decisions has shown some detriment to performance when alternatives 
increase from the traditional 2-choice paradigm up to 4 alternatives (Churchland, Kiani, & 
Shadlen, 2008; Leite & Ratcliff, 2010). The current experiment sought to extend this further by 
testing up to 8-choices; it was predicted that participants may adopt strategies to limit the 
problem space when given more than 4 choices to vet at once, as has been seen in more 
complicated multiple attribute decision experiments (Tversky & Sattath, 1979; Einhorn & 
Hogarth, 1981; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988). The results demonstrated an interesting two-
stage change in performance. As the number of alternatives increased from 2 to 4 choices there 
was an associated decrease in accuracy. However, as the alternatives increased further to 8 
choices there was both a greater drop in accuracy and an increase in reaction time. An analysis of 
the angular disparity of the errors found that these changes were present over and above any 
potential problems with motor execution as the response buttons were closer together. This 
suggests that it is unlikely participants were adopting a strategy to compensate for the increased 
number of alternatives available. In addition, the change from 4 to 8 response alternatives may 
have also been affected by the unavoidable increase of similarity between the alternatives, 
mimicking the changes in accuracy and reaction time seen in Chapter 2.  
The third experiment (4.0 ) examined how the timing of informative evidence can affect 
the decision process. We are not usually in control of when the environment presents us with the 
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perceptual information we must discriminate, so it seems unusual to use tasks in which the start 
of trial is also indicative of when information will be forthcoming. When the coherent motion 
was moved around in time, the results illuminated some interesting changes in performance. 
First, presenting motion soon after the start of the trial resulted in higher accuracy, but also 
slower decisions. Participants were more willing to wait and consider the evidence when it was 
delivered promptly. Conversely, evidence presented later in the trial resulted in less accurate, 
faster decisions. In addition, as they waited for informative evidence to be presented, the longer 
the wait before the presentation of coherent motion, the more likely participants would false 
alarm despite the lack of evidence available. Interestingly, there appeared to be a focus of when 
these false alarms were likely to occur that was not quite 2/3 of the way through the trial length 
even though participants were required to watch the whole trial regardless of response. Previous 
research has found similar results during neurophysiological recording of perceptual decisions in 
macaques and suggested that there may be motivation to reserve mental resources and thus 
truncate ongoing unsuccessful decisions (Kiani, Hanks, & Shadlen, 2008). 
The final experiment (5.0 ) explored how insertions of high quality evidence early in the 
decision could influence the impending response. Previous neurophysiological studies have 
demonstrated that bursts of information can change the rate at which activity in certain brain 
areas (e.g., lateral intraparietal cortex) accrues, potentially altering the timing of the decision 
(Huk & Shadlen, 2005). The implementation of the burst early in the trial was of particular 
interest given the results of the third experiment (4.0 ), which suggested that the decision process 
maintains integrity and is harder to terminate early in the trial compared to later. If the process 
maintains a high level of fidelity early in the trial, extra information should only influence the 
process and not cause the execution of the response. However, the relevance of the information 
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(either towards or against the correct response) should change the speed of the response. This 
hypothesis was only partially upheld, as the results told a more complicated story. Although 
trials with high coherent bursts in the direction of the correct response did result in faster 
decisions than trials with no burst, there was not a slowing of response when the burst was 
against the correct direction. In addition, the effects were most strongly demonstrated when all 
three trial types (Pro, Anti, and Regular) were mixed into the same block, rather than only two 
types. This suggests that despite best efforts and piloting of the experiment, some participants 
were still able to see the burst and use it to their advantage even when it was against the correct 
direction (though not perfectly: Anti trials resulted in lower accuracy). The shifts in results based 
on the composition of each block may highlight potential strategies on the part of the participants 
to limit the resources and time necessary to complete the decision (Tversky & Sattath, 1979; 
Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988; Kiani, Hanks, & Shadlen, 2008). 
Finally, an additional analysis (6.0 ) assessed whether or not trial-to-trial variability in 
reaction time occurred depending on previous trial status due to manipulation changes 
(similarity, timing of evidence, and burst experiments) or previous trial accuracy when feedback 
was available (burst experiment). While there has been some evidence of shifts in performance 
during multiple attribute decisions (Thomas, 1983; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988), trial-to-
trial shifts have not been found in previous spatial attention (Vul, Hanus, & Kanwisher, 2009) 
and auditory choice (Green, Smith, & von Gierke, 1983) experiments. The results of the analysis 
failed to indicate trial-to-trial variability in reaction time based on previous trial status in the 
similarity experiment (close options vs. far apart options), timing of evidence (early vs. late 
presentation of motion), or burst (no burst vs. pro burst vs. anti burst) experiments. However, the 
second analysis regarding previous trial accuracy did highlight some changes in reaction time 
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during the burst experiment in which participants were required to verify the accuracy of their 
response at the end of the trial. This verification stage forced participants to create their own 
feedback on their progress, which in turn appeared to change performance in the Anti and Mixed 
blocks. However, as noted in 6.0 , the resulting changes in reaction time were paradoxical. 
Performance was faster following correct trials than incorrect trials during Anti blocks, 
suggesting that correct trials increased confidence and lead to lower thresholds on succeeding 
trials. Interestingly, though, the reverse was true during Mixed blocks; performance was slower 
following correct trials than incorrect trials.  
7.2 RELATIONSHIP TO PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
It is often stated that the goal of perceptual decision research is to understand the 
complicated decision process by studying it in a simplified state (Gold & Shadlen, 2007). 
However, the collective literature on perceptual decisions to this point lacks a strong connection 
to the findings and theories about multiple attribute decisions, nor does it use consistent methods 
that allow for cross-comparison and consensus building among experiments. The primary goal of 
this dissertation was to systematically test perceptual decisions with an eye towards both the 
previous perceptual decision research as well as research on more complicated decision 
problems. The result was an interesting concert of findings that both agrees with and disconfirms 
some of the theories behind multiple attribute decisions. For example, although the perceptual 
stimulus does not have as many degrees of freedom for manipulation as multiple attribute 
problems, there were still some effects on performance when response alternatives became more 
similar (2.0 ). This agrees with prior work on multiple attribute decisions and similarity of 
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options (Biggs, Bedard, Gaber, & Linsmeier, 1985). On the other hand, participants failed to 
adopt strategies that increased efficiency and performance despite the increasing number of 
response alternatives entered into the decision process (3.0 ). This goes against previously 
demonstrated changes in performance dependent on the number of alternatives to be considered 
in any one decision (Tversky & Sattah, 1979; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981). Lastly, the trial-by-trial 
analysis in 6.0 only partially demonstrated variability in performance; the observed changes were 
not due to effort or motivation (Thomas, 1983) or the experience of certain conditions (Payne, 
Bettman, & Johnson, 1988), but rather prior trial performance. Collectively these results indicate 
that the assertion that perceptual decisions are a simplified version of the general decision 
process may not be fully valid. Therefore future studies of perceptual decisions should be careful 
about broad claims regarding the overall decision process. 
This dissertation also presents significant extensions of previous work on perceptual 
decisions. While there has been some recent interest in how the number of response alternatives 
affect performance (Churchland, Kiani, & Shadlen, 2008; Leite & Ratcliff, 2010), the majority of 
studies thus far have included binary alternatives, often from stimuli without a quantifiable 
spectrum of similarity. 3.0 demonstrated that performance in perceptual decisions decreases as 
the number of response alternatives increases, suggesting that future studies should consider how 
stimulus selection and task structure affect the process in addition to any particular manipulation 
of interest. Additionally, 4.0 investigated how the timing of evidence affects the decision 
process, another rarely considered task parameter (c.f., Kiani, Hanks, & Shadlen, 2008). Because 
we are not usually in charge of when the environment presents us with information to 
discriminate, it is important to consider how the timing of evidence compared to the start of the 
decision process may affect the overall decision. Interestingly, it appears that there may be a 
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timeout function that terminates the decision process after a certain amount of time, potentially 
in order to save mental resources for future processing (Kiani, Hanks, & Shadlen, 2008). 
Although the idea of a timeout function is relatively new to discussion of the perceptual decision 
process, it has been previously discussed in regards to memory function and unsuccessful 
searches (Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Anderson, 2007).  
7.3 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The results presented here highlight two potentially important avenues of future study. 
First, the paradoxical results of the trial-by-trial analysis in 6.0 suggest an interesting story about 
the role of feedback during ongoing decision processes and how it might alter future decisions. 
Investigating this effect could lead to previously unconsidered implications of how feedback 
and/or reward (e.g., trial-by-trial juice rewards in neurophysiological studies) might affect the 
overall results. At the very least, it would be interesting to reanalyze the neurophysiological data 
to see if prior trial performance affected neural firing rates in a way that is complementary to the 
changes in reaction time demonstrated here. These changes may come in either shifts in baseline 
firing activity at the start of the trial or the level of activity necessary to execute a response shift 
depending on prior trial performance. Examining which of these two changes occur can help 
separate exactly what is causing the changes in performance. Changes in baseline firing rate at 
the start of the trial would indicate some sort of preparation prior to the consideration of 
evidence. On the other hand, a shift in the level of activity necessary would indicate the shifting 
of threshold as theorized here, potentially an indication of confidence in ability. 
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Second, the evidence for a potential timeout function described behaviorally here and 
neurally elsewhere (Kiani, Hanks, & Shadlen, 2008) highlights a little examined factor in the 
decision process. It will be important to further investigate how time and expectations of 
forthcoming evidence impact the overall process. For example, the perceptual decisions used 
thus far in the current projects and previous literature were generally low-cost tasks in which 
there may be no reward (as presented here) or very little reward (a few drops of juice for each 
correct trial in the case of the macaque neurophysiological literature). If a decision has a higher 
cost or gain associated with it, it is possible the decision process will maintain fidelity later in 
time in order to maximize performance. Consider the difference between seeing someone 
familiar in a crowd while walking in your hometown versus seeing that someone while lost in a 
foreign city. In the former case it may not make a difference whether or not you accurately 
recognize the person, as it is unlikely to alter your interaction with the environment. However, in 
the latter case you may strain to determine whether or not the person is an acquaintance in order 
to call out and gain some help you may not otherwise be able to secure. 
7.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The study of perceptual decisions as a simplified example of the general decision process 
continues to be a useful exertion. However, caution must be taken as to how generalizable the 
results truly are to the more complicated multiple attribute process. In addition, the use of 
rewards during the task may be changing the decision process in an ongoing fashion that has 
otherwise not been accounted for in past analyses. This has potentially important implications 
towards the validity of previous findings. Future work should continue to taken these points into 
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consideration, as well as further explore the relationship between the timing of evidence and the 
decision process to more closely approximate how the process operates in vivo.  
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APPENDIX A 
EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS 
 This section contains the text for each experiment as presented in the instruction screens. 
Participants were first verbally instructed by the experimenter and then read through the screens 
at their own pace. The screens were intended to reiterate and reinforce the verbal instructions. 
A.1.1 Opening welcome screen 
The following was presented as the opening welcome screen for all experiments: 
Hello and welcome to the experiment. 
We are going to begin with some practice trials. 
You are going to see a series of images made up of moving dots. 
There is one basic task in this study described over the next few screens. 
Press the SPACE BAR for more instructions. 
 
After this screen was presented, each experiment then had two screens of experiment-specific 
instructions, described in separate sections below. 
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A.1.2 Instructions for the perceptual break experiment (2.0 ) 
First screen: 
When the cross at the center of the screen is red for two seconds, the dots do not move 
together and only random motion is present. DO NOT press anything when the cross is red. 
Focus on the period in which the cross turns white for 6 seconds. During this time some 
of the dots will move in the same direction together. It is your job to figure out which direction. 
You should make a response during every trial (i.e., each time the cross turns white). 
Each trial lasts 6 seconds, so you do not have to respond immediately. 
Press SPACE to continue. 
 
Second screen: 
 When the cross turns white you will also see two possible directions labeled “1” and “0”. 
You must decide which of these options is the correct one and press the corresponding key. The 
practice trials will start off relatively easy and work down to the difficult level of the actual study 
trials. Also, you will notice that the “1” and “0” will move closer and farther apart across trials. 
 Please only respond once during each trial; note, nothing will change when you press the 
button. As long as you think you pressed it hard enough for it to register, you should be fine. 
 Keep your eyes focused on the cross in the center of the screen. 
 Press the SPACE BAR to try some practice trials 
A.1.3 Instructions for the number of alternatives experiment (3.0 ) 
First screen: 
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When the cross at the center of the screen is red for two seconds, the dots do not move 
together and only random motion is present. DO NOT press anything when the cross is red. 
Focus on the period in which the cross turns white for 10 seconds. During this time some 
of the dots will move in the same direction together. It is your job to figure out which direct ion. 
You should make a response during every trial (i.e., each time the cross turns white). 
Each trial lasts 10 seconds, so you do not have to respond immediately. 
Press SPACE to continue. 
 
Second screen (one button version): 
 When you are reasonably confident you know the direction of motion, press the SPACE 
bar. At the end of the trial, the dots will start to gather around the center. If they are going in the 
same direction as your guess, press the SPACE bar again. If they are going in a different 
direction, don’t do anything and wait for the cross to turn red. 
Note, nothing will change when you press the button. As long as you think you pressed it 
hard enough for it to register, you should be fine. 
 Keep your eyes focused on the cross in the center of the screen. 
 Press the SPACE BAR to try some practice trials. 
 
Second screen (definitive response version): 
 When you are reasonably confident you know the direction of motion, press the 
corresponding key on the number pad (e.g., 8 = up, 2 = down, 7 = diagonal up/left). 
Please only respond once during each trial; note, nothing will change when you press the 
button. As long as you think you pressed it hard enough for it to register, you should be fine. 
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 Keep your eyes focused on the cross in the center of the screen. 
 Press the SPACE BAR to try some practice trials. 
A.1.4 Instructions for the timing of evidence experiment (4.0 ) 
First screen: 
When the cross at the center of the screen is red for two seconds, the dots do not move 
together and only random motion is present. DO NOT press anything when the cross is red. 
Focus on the period in which the cross turns white for 10 seconds. During this time some 
of the dots will move in the same direction together for about 2 seconds. It is your job to figure 
out which direction. 
You should make a response during every trial (i.e., each time the cross turns white). 
Each trial lasts 10 seconds, so you do not have to respond immediately. 
Press SPACE to continue. 
 
Second screen: 
 When you are reasonably confident you know the direction of motion, press the 
corresponding key on the number pad (e.g., 8 = up, 2 = down, 7 = diagonal up/left). 
Please only respond once during each trial; note, nothing will change when you press the 
button. As long as you think you pressed it hard enough for it to register, you should be fine. 
 Keep your eyes focused on the cross in the center of the screen. 
 Press the SPACE BAR to try some practice trials. 
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A.1.5 Instructions for the burst experiment (5.0 ) 
First screen:  
When the cross at the center of the screen is red for two seconds, the dots do not move 
together and only random motion is present. DO NOT press anything when the cross is red. 
Focus on the period in which the cross turns white for 16 seconds. The motion will be 
faint and hard to see at first, but will slowly grow into coherent motion in one of eight directions 
(the 4 cardinal directions and the diagonals).  
You should make a response during every trial (i.e., each time the cross turns white). 
Each trial lasts 16 seconds, so you do not have to respond immediately. 
Press SPACE to continue. 
 
Second screen:  
 When you are reasonably confident you know the direction of motion, press the SPACE 
bar. The trial will continue and the motion will still get clearer. 
 When the motion is extremely obvious at the end of the trial, press the SPACE bar again 
if your original guess was CORRECT. Do not press anything if you were incorrect. 
Please respond once during each trial and once at the end of the trial when the motion is 
obvious if you were CORRECT; note, nothing will change when you press the button. As long as 
you think you pressed it hard enough for it to register, you should be fine. 
 Keep your eyes focused on the cross in the center of the screen. 
 Press the SPACE BAR to try some practice trials. 
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APPENDIX B 
STRATEGY ASSESSMENT 
Increasing Choice Experiment 
Subject # _________ 
Date _____________ 
 
1. Describe any strategy you had for the 2-choice blocks (either right vs. left OR up vs. down). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Describe any strategy you had for the 4-choice blocks (up/down/left/right OR the diagonals). 
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3. Describe any strategy you had for the 8-choice blocks. 
 
 
 
 
 
4. On average, how confident were you when you made your response (out of 100%)? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We suspect that people might be dividing the screen as part of their strategy. For each of the 
pictures below, give a percentage out of 100% for how similar it is to the way you were dividing 
up the screen.  
2-choice blocks 
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4-choice blocks 
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